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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent Delaware Supreme Court decision in Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc.' appears to undo six years of development of the law of interested merg-
ers; i.e., mergers in which one of the corporations controls the other at the
time the merger is proposed and approved. However, the decision changes the
law much less than may first appear. Rather Weinberger is notable because it
provides the potential for a coherent theoretical framework for analyzing all
mergers and because it represents the recognition of the fact that, even though
a merger is "tainted" by conflict of interest, it may nonetheless be beneficial to
both the majority and minority shareholders.
The most common type of interested merger, and the one in which the
issues are most graphically presented, is the "freeze-out" merger. Simply
stated, a freeze-out merger occurs when a minority shareholder is forced to
give up his shares of stock in a corporation to the controlling majority in ex-
change for cash or some non-equity instrument.' This can be lawfully accom-
* Copyright 1984, by Richard A. Booth.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. A.B. The Uni-
versity of Michigan, 1973; J.D. Yale University, 1976. I would like to thank Marvin
Chirelstein, Jan Deutsch and Mary Siegel for reviewing a draft of this article and
Sydney Hurley and Eugene Albert for their research assistance and criticism and
Christine Booth for her editorial commentary.
1. 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
2. The phrase "freeze-out" is only one of many names given to mergers which
eliminate minority shareholder interests. Other names include "take-out," "cash-out"
and "squeeze-out." "Freeze-out" is widely regarded as somewhat perjorative but is
used here despite the fact that the position taken is that such mergers are quite justifia-
ble. Aside from a natural contrariness on the part of the writer, the phrase is used
because it serves as a constant reminder that those who carry out such mergers do
1
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plished by the parent corporation using its voting control over a subsidiary to
propose and approve a merger (or other combination) between the parent and
the subsidiary.3 If there is no pre-existing parent, one can be formed and the
shares of the majority transferred to it in exchange for all of the new corpora-
tion's stock.
4
The obvious objections to freeze-out mergers are that the parent decides
whether and when the minority will sell, and it decides the price in the ab-
sence of arm's length bargaining. There is nothing to insure that a fair price
will be set. Even if the price is fair, there is every reason to expect the parent
to set the lowest defensible fair price.5 Thus, courts have traditionally been
willing to scrutinize interested mergers although the availability of the ap-
praisal remedy6 has inclined them to insist that plaintiffs show particular ex-
amples of advantage taking.7 While this approach gave the parent the ultimate
right to freeze out the subsidiary's minority, 8 the courts, in effect, reserved the
right to increase the price if unfairness appeared.
When corporate freeze-outs became popular in the middle 1970s, courts
began to recognize, as commentators had urged,9 that there was a serious
indeed have a duty to those who are frozen-out and because it is more colorful than the
alternatives.
3. The transaction may be accomplished in numerous ways. For a concise dis-
cussion of techniques, see Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49
N.Y.U. L. REv. 987 (1974).
4. Such transactions are often referred to as "going private" mergers since
they involve only one going business and serve no significant purpose other than the
elimination of minority shareholders. "Going private" is often also used to describe a
variety of non-merger techniques for eliminating minority shareholder interest. See
Borden, supra note 3, at 990-93, 997-1000.
5. The motivations and abuses of freeze-outs have been well catalogued. See
Borden, supra, note 3; Brudney, A Note on "Going Private", 61 VA. L. REv. 1019
(1975); Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J.
1354 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement]; Greene,
Corporate Freeze-out Mergers: A Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1976);
NOTE, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975).
6. Simply stated, a shareholder is entitled to have his shares appraised and
repurchased for cash by the issuing corporation upon the occurrence of certain funda-
mental changes such as mergers. All states' corporation codes provide such a right
though the rights differ greatly in detail from state to state. See Note, A Reconsidera-
tion of the Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting Shareholder's Right of Ap-
praisal, 74 MICH. L. REv. 1023, 1023-26 (1976). In Delaware, appraisal is governed
by DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (1983).
7. See e.g. Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc. 41 Del. Ch. 7, 187 A.2d 78 (Sup.
Ct. 1962); see also Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). The classic discussion of the plaintiff's burden to show
facts which justify a full scale trial on fairness grounds is Vorenberg, Exclusiveness of
the Dissenting Stockholders' Appraisal Right, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1964). See
also Weiss, The Law of Take Out Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 624, 653-55 & n.191 (1981).
8. See Weiss, supra note 7, at 650-54.
9. See note 5, supra.
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question whether it was fair to force a shareholder out of equity participation
at any price. It was argued that, from a shareholder's point of view, fairness
may mean more than fair price. That is, even a shareholder in a publicly
traded company, who has no expectation of participating in management, may
have a legitimate interest in the form of his investment. To deny a minority
shareholder potential appreciation of his investment (and to force him to iden-
tify substitute investments) should require something more than a fair price.'"
As a result, Delaware courts have applied the "business purpose" doctrine
which requires that there be some good reason to get rid of the minority other
than the personal motivations of the majority."
Thus, for the six years before Weinberger, freeze-out mergers were gov-
erned by principles enunciated in 1977 in Singer v. Magnavox Corp. 2 In
Singer, the parent had acquired an 84% interest in the subsidiary through a
friendly tender offer at $9 per share. The parent then announced its intention
to acquire any remaining shares through any legal means. 3 Less than a year
after the tender offer, the parent effected a freeze-out merger of the remaining
16% minority also at $9 per share. Representatives of the minority sued the
parent claiming that the merger was illegal because it was not undertaken for
a valid business purpose. They claimed that the sole purpose of the merger was
to eliminate the minority and that the price paid was inadequate.
The parent argued that the merger was accomplished within the letter of
the law and that the minority's right to an appraisal and cash payment was an
adequate remedy for any unfairness. The Delaware Supreme Court, in a
landmark decision, reasoned that the parent-majority owed a fiduciary duty to
the minority and that mere compliance with the letter of the law in the corpo-
ration code did not necessarily satisfy that duty. The court expressly recog-
nized the shareholder's interest in the form of his investment.' 4 The court
ruled that a merger undertaken for the sole purpose of eliminating the minor-
ity was illegal and that even when a proper purpose is shown, the transaction
will be scrutinized for "entire fairness.""
Subsequently, in Tanzer v. International General Industries,"1 the Dela-
ware Supreme Court held that a legitimate business purpose of the parent,
rather than the subsidiary, was sufficient to justify a freeze-out merger.17
10. See Vorenberg, supra note 7, at 1200-05.
11. See text at notes 58-74, infra.
12. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
13. Id. at 971. The management of the target had opposed an offer at $8 per
share but were guaranteed their jobs at existing salary levels in connection with the $9
offer, which they did not oppose but apparently did not endorse.
14. Id. at 975-80.
15. Id. at 980. The notion of "entire fairness" descends from Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 298, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Del. 1952), an-
other "interested merger" case.
16. 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
17. Id. at 1124-25.
1984]
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Thereafter, in Roland International Corp. v. Najjar,18 the same court held
that the principles of Singer and Tanzer applied with equal force to short-form
mergers-a special procedure for merging a 90% owned subsidiary into the
parent without a vote of the subsidiary's shareholders. 19
Unlike the situation in Singer, the freeze-out merger in Weinberger ap-
parently was not planned with any certainty at the time the parent obtained
control and the merger was not effectuated until three years thereafter. These
facts made it a stronger case for the kind of relief afforded the minority in
Singer.20 In Weinberger the parent had acquired a bare majority (50.5%) of
the subsidiary in a friendly tender offer at $21 per share in April 1975. The
subsidiary's stock was trading at just under $14 at the time, and the tender
offer was greatly oversubscribed.21 Having surplus cash and having found no
other suitable acquisitions, the parent decided to propose a freeze-out merger
in February 1978. It offered the same $21 per share price, which still repre-
sented a substantial premium over the $14.50 market price of the subsidiary's
stock.22
The price had first been proposed internally to the parent in a report that
stated the parent could pay up to $24 per share and still derive an adequate
return of 15.5%.23 The report was apparently based in part on information
obtained from the subsidiary; the subsidiary's board was controlled by the par-
ent and included four members who were also four of five top ranking officers
of the parent and members of the parent's board.2 The proposal was submit-
ted to the subsidiary's board, but the parent's maximum price was not dis-
closed, except, of course to the dual members who prepared the report and
who excused themselves from the decision to approve the merger.20 The
merger was submitted to a vote of the shareholders-still without disclosure of
the parent's maximum price-and was approved by 92% of minority shares
18. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
19. Id. at 1035-36. The short form merger statute is found in DEL CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 253 (1983). The long form merger, which requires approval by the sharehold-
ers of both parent and subsidiary and the board of directors of the subsidiary, is found
in § 251. For an explanation of the origin and purposes of this special merger provision,
see Weiss, supra note 7, at 641-49.
20. Several commentators have argued that distinctions should be drawn be-
tween arm's length 100% acquisitions which are carried out in two steps, partial acqui-
sitions in which the parent later decides to acquire 100% of the subsidiary's stock and
pure "going private" transactions in which the parent has no independent business but
is formed only to oust the minority. See Brudney, A Note, supra note 5, at 1028-30;
Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1357-76; Greene, supra note
5, at 491-96; Weiss, supra note 7, at 654 n.184; see also, Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair
Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L. REv. 297, 308 (1974)[here-
inafter cited as Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares].
21. 457 A.2d at 704.
22. Id. at 705-06.
23. Id. at 705, 708-09, 711-12.
24. Id. at 705.
25. Id. at 707.
520 [Vol. 49
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Representatives of the minority sued, initially alleging only that the
freeze-out merger lacked a business purpose and that the price was unfair, not
yet having discovered the nondisclosures. The trial court dismissed the suit on
the theory that, if the majority does not use its controlling position to force
approval of the merger, there is no self-dealing.2
7
Plaintiffs amended their complaint to add the allegation that non-disclo-
sures had tainted the minority vote. The trial court held that it was plaintiffs'
burden to point to particular reasons for judicial review, and apparently con-
cluded that plaintiffs had not overcome the presumption of fairness created by
the vote.28 While the court did not need to reach the business purpose issue, it
nonetheless held that the parent had shown a legitimate business purpose,
namely, that the acquisition of the remaining minority interest was a good
investment. 29 Since this is probably true in all freeze-out mergers, the decision
rendered the business purpose test utterly meaningless. 30
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that it is the majority's
burden to show a fair vote, and the minority's burden to prove unfairness by
specific acts of fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by the major-
ity.3 ' The court found that, because the parent failed to disclose the directors'
report and the cursory nature of the fairness opinion obtained from an invest-
ment bank, the vote was tainted and the transaction was unfair.32
It is not clear that the rule set forth by the Delaware Supreme Court
differed much from that applied by the trial court. The supreme court agreed
that the plaintiff must allege specific acts of fraud.13 The court also placed the
burden on the majority to show a fair vote, but never specified who bore the
first burden. It would seem evident that it should be the plaintiff, since the
same facts which would show fraud would also show that the vote was not fair.
But if that is the case, the trial court's formulation is equivalent to the su-
preme court's. 34 It seems, then, that the disagreement between the courts had
to do with the seriousness of the nondisclosures. This conclusion is supported
by the fact that the supreme court held that the vote was tainted and that the
26. Id. at 708, 712.
27. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 1979).
28. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983).
29. Id. at 1350.
30. 457 A.2d at 715. See Weiss, supra note 7, at 671, n.300.
31. 457 A.2d at 703. Initially, the decision of the trial court was affirmed, but
reargument was granted and the original opinion was withdrawn. Deutsch, Weinberger
v. UOP: Analysis of a Dissent, 6 CORP. L. REV. 29 (1983).
32. 457 A.2d at 703. The court relied on Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211,
224 (Del. 1979) for the proposition that shareholder ratification shifts the burden of
proof of unfairness from defendants to plaintiff. See also Tanzer v. International Gen.
Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 386 (Del. Ch. 1979) (on remand).
33. 457 A.2d at 712
34. See note 7, supra.
1984]
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merger was unfair. It did not merely remand for additional factual inquiry."8
Even though Weinberger primarily addresses disclosure, it is clear that
the Delaware court substantially altered the principles of fiduciary duty devel-
oped in Singer. Singer itself was notable for recognizifig the tension between
the majority's fiduciary duty and the competing legitimate interests of major-
ity shareholders.3" The changes wrought by Weinberger, however, have to do
with specificity and burden.
Under Singer and its progeny, a freeze-out merger generated what
amounted to a per se presumption of a violation: the majority was required to
prove a business purpose, and even if it did the merger would be scrutinized
for "entire fairness." In turn, the notion of "entire fairness," which at first
suggests nothing but the court's holding that these mergers should be really
fair instead of just fair, seems to have been the result of the inadequacy of a
simple self-dealing approach to freeze-outs. In Singer, for example, while
there was an obvious conflict of interest, the price was presumably fair because
it was equal to the tender offer price which had induced over 84% of the
shareholders to sell less than a year before.37 The additional requirement of
business purpose, however, allowed for further scrutiny, and the notion of "en-
tire fairness" allowed for a potential remedy even in cases where simple fair-
ness was quite apparent. In other words, the Singer business purpose test
served primarily to afford case by case review of interested mergers.
Thus, as Singer was finally mapped out, plaintiffs bore little of the burden
of persuasion. Now, under Weinberger, plaintiffs must prove specific acts of
fraud and unfairness where the majority has shown a fair vote. Weinberger
therefore provides a road map for the majority to avoid any serious challenge
to the legality of a freeze-out. Even in cases in which the majority bears the
burden of proving fairness (e.g. when no vote is taken), it gains the benefit of
specific allegations to answer.
The Weinberger court's implicit approval of properly structured freeze-
out mergers effectively relegates the minority to its appraisal remedy.38 There-
fore, the court also undertook to reform the appraisal remedy to make it easier
for dissenting shareholders to prove unfairness. 39 The court held that future
appraisal proceedings should take into account any methods of valuation "gen-
35. 457 A.2d at 703, 714. Though it is conceivable that ultimately the trial
court will again find the price paid to be fair, the supreme court's opinion is so strongly
worded that it is difficult to believe that the decision was not meant to be one on the
merits. For example, the court states that the parent's failure to disclose the full range
of fair prices "cannot but undermine a conclusion that this merger meets reasonable
test of fairness." Id. at 712.
36. 380 A.2d at 976. See Borden, supra note 3, at 1013-15; Note, Fairness in
Freezeout Transactions: Observations on Coping with Going Private Problems, 69 Ky.
L.J. 77 (1980-81).
37. See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1362-65.
38. See note 6, supra.
39. See text at notes 116-22, infra.
[Vol. 49
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erally considered acceptable in the financial community," and that a narrow
definition of post-merger gains should be applied.40
Prior to Weinberger, Delaware invariably followed the "block method" of
valuation for determining fair price. The block method considered a weighted
average of asset value, market price, and earnings value.41 Weinberger indi-
cates that now Delaware courts will recognize discounted cash flow and premi-
ums paid in comparable transactions as evidence of fair price.42 While the
court did not expressly abandon the block method, the court did state that it
"shall no longer exclusively control such proceedings. ' 43 It would thus not be
surprising to find discounted cash flow and comparable premiums as the over-
whelming and possibly exclusive factors in most future appraisals. The court's
language suggests this would be acceptable by allowing for the possibility that
an appraiser might decide not to apply the block method at all in an appropri-
ate case. Further, the court's implicit endorsement of the discounted cash flow
method suggests that it could be heavily relied on since its underlying assump-
tions contradict, to some extent, the assumptions underlying earnings value in
the block method. 44
In addition, before Weinberger, a shareholder was entitled only to the
value of his shares before the merger. For example, he would receive no addi-
tional compensation based on any premium the acquiring company would be
willing to pay because it knew the target could be managed more efficiently.' 5
Yet that may well be the very sort of assessment the shareholder makes when
he decides to buy shares in a particular company; he may figure that the com-
pany is ripe for a take-over, or indeed a freeze-out. It hardly seems fair that a
minority shareholder who has correctly perceived that kind of value should
have it taken away.46 Now, after Weinberger, such value may be compensated
by appraisal.
Although the Delaware appraisal statute provides for payment of fair
value "exclusive of any element of value arising from the accomplishment or
40. 457 A.2d at 712-14.
41. Id. at 712.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 713.
44. As the name suggests, cash flow analysis focuses on the cash that may be
extracted from a business while "earnings" or "income" (as those words are used by
accountants) includes accrued transactions which have not necessarily been followed by
cash receipts or payments at the time the accountant's statement is rendered. See
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333, 1357 (Del. Ch. 1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701
(Del. 1983); S. SIEGEL & D. SEIGEL, ACCOUNTING AND FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE 118-
28 (1983).
45. See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1979) (on
remand).
46. See Weiss, supra note 7, at 677-80. See generally Chazen, Fairness from a
Financial Point of View in Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is "Third-Party Sale
Value" the Appropriate Standard?, 36 Bus. LAW. 1439, 1451 (1981).
19841
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expectation of a merger,"' 7 the court reasoned that the addition of the word
"fair" by amendment in 1976 and its reemphasis in 1981 amendments sig-
naled a legislative intent that shareholders be fully compensated. 48 This argu-
ment is not weighty, though it is difficult to make such assessments in a rari-
fled atmosphere in which "entire fairness" connotes so much. The rule is,
however, quite defensible: the fact that the legislature directs that a company
be valued on the basis of its initial management and business does not dictate
whether a premium to acquire the business should be considered inherent in
the business or inherent in the merger. As will be seen, however, there are
good reasons to consider such a premium as part of the intrinsic worth of the
original business.49
Finally, the Weinberger court held that, in the discretion of the chancel-
lor, an appraisal award may include the elements of rescissory damages, e.g.,
the monetary value of the shares in question as of the time of trial.50 Ap-
praisal, in short, must afford the full complement of potential relief. Now
there is nothing a plaintiff may obtain by litigation that he cannot get in an
appraisal.
The Weinberger court does not say in so many words that proving unfair-
ness will now be easier, but it is impossible to deny the solicitude paid minority
shareholders. Besides adding wholly new categories of value to those compen-
sable to shareholders, the court describes the new approach as "more liberal"
and an "expanded" remedy, and it describes the Chancellor's powers as "com-
plete to fashion any form of equitable and monetary relief as may be appropri-
ate."'51 One could argue that this last comment refers only to litigation, though
the argument is unconvincing given the unmistakable changes in the appraisal
remedy.
In the final analysis, the changes effected by Weinberger are less drastic
than they may appear to be. First, the business purpose test was never very
well established and there were numerous signals prior to Weinberger that it
would soon be rejected altogether. Weinberger did, however, substitute the re-
quirement of fair dealing, which is best understood as an emphasis on share-
holder voting or good faith efforts to replicate arm's length negotiations, a
change which does indeed signal a new attitude that even interested mergers
may be mutually beneficial. Second, and herein lies the decision's greater in-
novation, Weinberger renovates certain key concepts under the Delaware ap-
praisal statute so as to allow the courts to construct a fair dealing outcome in
cases of self-dealing. This change raises some vital questions; for example, be-
cause the court has granted an expanded appraisal right applicable in all
mergers, dissenters may be able to prove they deserve additional compensation
47. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983).
48. 457 A.2d at 713-14.
49. See text at notes 147-65, infra.
50. 457 A.2d at 714.
51. Id. at 713-15.
524 [Vol. 49
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in many cases, even in the absence of fraud. As will be seen, however, analysis
of the new kinds of evidence which may be introduced compels the conclusion
that appraisal will not generate any additional compensation for dissenters in
fairly approved mergers.5 2
II. THE DEMISE OF THE BUSINESS PURPOSE TEST
In order to state a claim for unfairness under Singer, as it was finally
elaborated, a plaintiff was required to allege that no legitimate business pur-
pose existed for the freeze-out merger, that the price to be paid to the minority
shareholders was inadequate and that the minority was unable to veto the
transaction.53 The Singer test differed from the traditional approach primarily
in including business purpose. Prior to Singer, self-dealing and price inade-
quacy often sufficed to achieve judicial review of a transaction in Delaware.54
It was somewhat more difficult, however, to obtain a fairness review at equity
if appraisal rights were available. One was generally required to allege specific
acts of self-dealing, which can be quite difficult in carefully planned freeze-
outs. Thus, the business purpose test justified a higher level of scrutiny, even
though the Delaware court could simply have held that freeze-outs were per se
self-dealing. 5  That was, in essence, the conclusion reached in Tanzer when
52. Another summary of Weinberger may be found in Weiss, The Law of Take
Out Mergers: Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. Ushers in Phase Six, 4 CARDOZO L. REV. 245
(1983) (updating Weiss, supra, note 7). There, as in the earlier piece, it is argued that
the business purpose test was designed to allow the courts to pass on mergers without
grappling with the issues of valuation. Id. at 248. It is also argued that Weinberger
indicated sympathy for the notion that fair value is the price the minority could obtain
if the subsidiary were sold to an outsider and that fair dealing invariably requires the
parent to disclose to the subsidiary its valuation of the minority interest. Id. at 251-56.
The argument advanced here is quite to the contrary.
53. See Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 496 (Del. 1982).
54. See Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel, 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107, 109-10
(Del. 1952).
55. This is not to suggest that the business purpose test was contrived for resolv-
ing freeze-out suits. Rather it is an established exception to the business judgment rule.
See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93 (1979).
Application of the test to freeze-outs was indicated in that typically the test was used
in situations in which arguable self-dealing was clearly authorized or necessary. See,
e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999
(1981). The test is in effect a fall-back standard to be used when simple self-dealing
analysis begs the question. As such the standard it sets for management is necessarily
lower. It is similar to the literal meaning of "gross and palpable overreaching." See
Meyerson v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 245 A.2d 789, 794 (Del. Ch. 1967); Arsht,
supra, at 107. However, the test applied in Singer and its descendants was very differ-
ent from the standard application. In practice, once management had shown a substan-
tial reason for its challenged action, its burden was satisfied. In short, it was up to the
plaintiff to prove that there was no business purpose for the challenged action. See, e.g.,
Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). Just about the only way of
doing that would be to show that there existed alternative ways of accomplishing man-
agement's ends that were less prejudicial to the minority. See, e.g., Jones v. H.F.
9
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the court held that despite a showing of business purpose a minority share-
holder was still entitled to a fairness hearing and potentially a remedy."0
The Singer court did not focus on the inability of the minority to veto the
merger as a factor to be established by plaintiffs. This element of the cause of
action was later recognized in Harman v. Masoneilan International, Inc.,57 as
being essential to showing self-dealing. It is a principle virtually congruent to
placing the burden of proof of unfairness on the minority when the transaction
has been ratified by a majority of the minority. Note, however, that the rule as
stated in Harman was not merely a refinement of Singer, but, in fact, a partial
reversal. The Singer court had found no actionable self-dealing where the
merger statute had been followed to the letter. Apparently, this induced the
court to superimpose the business purpose test. The Harman court, on the
other hand, recognized that, even though self-dealing is unavoidable in a
freeze-out merger, the potential for objectionable advantage taking by insiders
could be avoided by a fair vote, thus eliminating the rationale for the business
purpose test as a means of distinguishing which freeze-outs would be allowed
to proceed.
The concept of business purpose also applied at the remedy stage once
plaintiff had made out a claim under Singer.58 The defendant parent was then
required to show the entire fairness of the transaction, one element of which
was its business purpose. If the defendant failed to demonstrate that the entire
transaction was fair, it faced equitable relief including paying a higher price
after the fact.
Despite all this, except for establishing a per se cause of action for freeze-
outs, nothing ever depended on a merger's business purpose except the juris-
diction of the court of equity.59 Indeed, the plaintiff needed only to allege its
absence. It was up to the majority to prove specifics. Thus the business pur-
pose test was little more than an excuse to allow minority shareholders their
day in court instead of relegating them to their appraisal remedy. Plaintiffs
were thus allowed to attack the fairness of the transaction in litigation,
whereas in the absence of a business purpose test (and some plea for equitable
relief) a plaintiff's claim would be for inadequacy of price and nothing more.
Since there is a statutory remedy for simple unfairness, namely appraisal, any
recognition of a dual remedy would have been difficult to limit to particular
kinds of mergers as Harman itself demonstrated.60 Moreover, few freeze-out
Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 592 (1969); Wilkes v.
Springside Nursing Home, 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976); Brudney & Chirel-
stein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1346.
56. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
57. 442 A.2d 487 (Del. 1982).
58. See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 390 (Del. Ch.
1979).
59. See Weiss, supra note 7, at 667-71.
60. Harman was a stock for stock merger and did not, therefore, raise any clear
question of the shareholder's rights to the form of his investment. The shareholder
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mergers were ever enjoined. 6' Courts of equity fell back to monetary awards.
Indeed, in Roland International Corp. v. Najjar,6 the supreme court held
that a complaint requesting only money damages stated a claim in equity.
Notwithstanding any potential efficacy the business purpose test may
have developed, it was quite severely confined almost from the start. In
Tanzer,63 it was held that the business purpose need not be that of the subsidi-
ary. The business purpose of a parent or majority shareholder would suffice.
Indeed, the trial court in Weinberger held that it was sufficient that the parent
regarded the subsidiary as a good investment.64 But what parent would even
propose a venture that it did not consider a good business move? As the Dela-
ware Supreme Court and at least one commentator recognized, the business
purpose test had been "interpreted out of existence."65
Interestingly, "business purpose," as defined in Weinberger, is very close
to the abuse that many commentators saw when freeze-out mergers became
popular. Since the parent has inside information, it could be expected to at-
tempt a freeze-out at a time when business was about to improve or when it
otherwise believes that the subsidiary's stock is worth more than the minority
thinks it is. Even though it might be difficult to prove that the majority had
failed to disclose anything about the bright prospects for the company, a
freeze-out would not be proposed when business was declining. The odds
greatly favored the majority. Thus it was argued that the mechanism of the
freeze-out was so prone to abuse that it should be prohibited altogether, or at
least in the absence of a proper business purpose.6 6
There is, however, justification for the Weinberger trial court's view. As
was recognized in Singer and Tanzer, the parent is entitled to exercise its
argued, however, that the merger in question was designed to eliminate the minority
from further meaningful equity participation and the complaint was ultimately upheld.
Ironically, the parent itself was cashed out in a subsequent merger. Sterling v.
Mayflower Hotel, 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952), from which the entire
fairness standard descends, was also a stock for stock merger which calls into question
the form-of-investment rationale or at least calls for a better explanation than the no-
tion that the shareholder has a right to continued equity participation. As will be seen,
however, valid questions can be raised about the form of investment even in stock for
stock transactions. See text at notes 70-82, and note 161, infra.
61. See, e.g., Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978).
62. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
63. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
64. 426 A.2d at 1342-43, 1348-50.
65. 457 A.2d at 715; Weiss, supra, note 7, at 671 n.300.
66. Supra note 5; Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Stan-
dard, 3 SEc. REG. L.J. 33 (1975). Professors Brudney and Chirelstein saw the business
purpose test as "misdirected" and having "no role whatever to play in this field." Brud-
ney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1356. They reasoned that economic
efficiencies could arise from mergers between two functioning enterprises and that busi-
ness purpose was inherent in such mergers. Id. And in their view, since no such efficien-
cies could arise from a mere rearrangement of stock ownership, going private mergers
should be banned. Id. at 1367; see also Weiss, supra note 7, at 667-68.
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rights as a shareholder just as is the minority.67 The parent has the largest
stake in the subsidiary. But the minority effectively establishes the value of the
subsidiary, since the trading activity of the minority generates the market
price.6 8 If the market price is too low, the parent is harmed whenever it uses
its shares in the subsidiary (for example, as payment for an acquisition or in
connection with an employee incentive plan).6 9
It is perfectly legitimate for the majority and the minority to differ on the
value of the enterprise. It is generally agreed shareholders value dividends.70
Dividends may be obtained in two forms. The corporation may pay them out
of leftover cash, or the corporation may reinvest the cash in investments.
These investments will generate more cash in the future leading to still higher
dividends and causing a present increase in the value of the corporation's
stock.
To the extent that the company chooses to pay out cash, it is easy for a
shareholder to calculate the return. However, it is difficult to assess the riski-
ness of those returns and hence to know whether the return is adequate.71 It is
still more difficult to assess the value of investments made by the corporation
with the cash it has retained, since reasonable minds may differ both as to the
expected return and the risk. Even if it were possible to attain wide agreement
in return and risk, the majority and the minority might differ on the cost of
the funds being invested. If the majority can raise money at lower rates than
those demanded by shareholders for the same income stream, it will view the
minority stock as worth more than the minority thinks.
Finally, it may be that the parent has discovered an investment opportu-
nity that it is not required to share with the subsidiary but which nonetheless
67. Professor Borden argues that freeze-outs should be viewed primarily as con-
troversies between groups of shareholders and not as matters of corporate governance.
Sisk, Book Review, 38 Bus. LAW. 271, 273 (1982) (reviewing A. BORDEN, GOING
PRIVATE (1982)). Indeed the principle is mentioned in Singer, 380 A.2d at 976, and
expressly recognized in Tanzer, 379 A.2d at 1123. Numerous other courts have recog-
nized that there exists a realm of legitimate competition between majority and minority
shareholders, that is, an area in which the majority, despite its fiduciary duty to the
minority, may legitimately pursue its self-interest. See note 55, supra.
68. See text at notes 151-59, infra.
69. See Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F.Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y.1974), ajffd, 514
F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975); Borden, supra note 3, at 1013-14 (controlling shareholders
have an obvious interest in the success or failure of their business). In this regard,
going private is no different from any other freeze-out. See note 66, supra.
70. See W. KLEIN, BusINEss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 211-12 (1980).
71. As used here, returns refer to the cash that may be expected by the inves-
tor, that is, a weighted average of the possible outcomes. Risk refers to the dispersion
of those possible outcomes, that is, it is a measure of how drastic the possible diver-
gence from the average is, which, of course, the average itself does not disclose. See id.
at 145-55. The higher the risk, the higher the rate of return an investor will demand.
See J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, MANAGERIAL FINANCE 362-63, 432-33 (1978). Thus
as between two different stocks with the same expected total dividend, the riskier one
will sell for less and hence will generate a higher percentage return.
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fits in well with the subsidiary's business. No doubt some would argue that
there are no such opportunities since the majority has a strict and overwhelm-
ing duty to run the company for the benefit of all the shareholders.7 2 However,
that view seems a bit too strict since it implies that once a shareholder attains
control he must forego any opportunity that would be useful to the corporation
no matter where or how the opportunity may have been found.73 Indeed, if
that were the law it would be reason enough to seek to eliminate minority
interests.74
The disagreement between majority and minority over the value of a com-
pany may be viewed as one over business policies and strategies which are
virtually universally agreed to be matters left to the sole discretion of the
board of directors. Suppose that in the parent's view the subsidiary is worth
much more than the minority appears to think it is worth. This is not an un-
likely state of affairs since the parent bought and held its controlling position
presumably because it was optimistic about the subsidiary's business. The low
market price, however, is indicative of the shareholders' belief that dividends
will not be increasing as a result of management's new investments as fast or
as much as management seems to think. The low price is an implicit demand
for a higher rate of return either in the form of current dividends or a more
popular investment program looking to quicker or more apparent growth.7 5
The shareholders thus suffer from management's policies. Although the parent
believes its policies are optimal, it suffers from the public perception whenever
it uses the subsidiary's stock.
On the other hand, the parent's failure to adjust its policies is equivalent
to its retaining the equity it perceives without generating any return for the
shareholders. But such retention of equity and failure to pay dividends contra-
venes management's implicit contract with investors that the company will
find investments that are better than those the shareholders can find on their
own. 7 The shareholders too may be thought of as in breach of their bargain
with management; they insist, in effect, that management change either its
72. See generally Brudney, supra note 5; Brudney & Clark, A New Look at
Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REv. 998 (1981).
73. For an exposition of the prevailing analysis of corporate opportunity cases,
see Burg v. Horn 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967), Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d
121 (2d. Cir 1934), cert. denied, Biddle v. Irving Trust Co., 294 U.S. 708 (1935);
Johnston v. Greene, 35 Del. Ch, 479, 121 A.2d 919 (Del. 1956); Guth v. Loft, 23 Del.
Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, (Del. 1939). Ultimately the issue is one of deciding, with respect
to particular behavior, whether it is within or without the realm of activity which the
manager has contracted to undertake as a fiduciary.
74. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d. Cir. 1980) cert. denied,
450 U.S. 999 (1981).
75. Of course there are situations in which the market price is intentionally
driven down, either by withholding dividends or otherwise, simply in order to make
going private cheaper to the insiders. See, e.g., Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135
N.J. Super. 36, 342 A.2d 566 (1975).
76. See W. KLEIN, supra note 70, at 214-15.
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payout or investment policy."
Ultimately, the parent cannot justify retaining unused equity. 8 The
straightforward way of solving this problem is for the majority (which thinks
the stock is worth more) to buy out the minority (which thinks the stock is
worth less). This can be done, of course, only with some degree of force since
it is impossible to negotiate with hundreds of shareholders. Even if it were
possible, some would hold out, either irrationally or strategically,7" the latter
in the belief that the majority will pay more to eliminate the last vestiges of a
public market which could continue to set a low price.80 Some coercion may
thus be excused because of the harm visited on the parent.
If minority shareholders are almost always correct in these "disputes," a
presumption against freeze-outs can be justified. But it would seem that insid-
ers are in a better position to devise and pursue the most profitable investment
strategies. At the very least the law should not incorporate the opposite pre-
sumption in favor of outsiders. That is equivalent to presuming that the minor-
ity's business judgment should be followed or, at least, that the minority
should have a veto over business strategies it dislikes,
Thus, although the business judgment rule always seemed out of place in
defense of freeze-outs, 81 at a deeper level it is quite to the point. The minority
should not be favored in the struggle if for no other reason than that it cannot
77. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Berwald v.
Mission Dev. Co., 40 Del. Ch. 509, 185 A.2d 480 (Del. 1962); Dodge v. Ford Motor
Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
78. Indeed, in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919),
while the court upheld management's retention of the vast majority of the funds in
question, it ordered the corporation to pay out $19,000,000 in surplus funds which were
found unnecessary to carry out any of the company's plans. In effect, a company under-
valued on the market (that is, worth more as a private concern) is retaining equity to
no good use, though that may only be apparent to the insiders. If the company is un-
dervalued because of pessimism concerning its investment plans (and not because of
any repressive refusal to pay dividends in order to drive down the market price) and if
it is in a cash position to do it, one could argue that there is a duty under such circum-
stances to freeze-out the public at the insider's view of a (higher) fair price, or to
repurchase stock on the open market since both are the functional equivalent of declar-
ing a dividend. Relegating shareholders to the open market, when they disagree in any
significant numbers with either pay-out or investment policies, is an inadequate
response.
79. See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1359-60.
80. Indeed, if the number of outstanding shares remaining is sufficiently small,
the market price will be further depressed for lack of "float" with which to make a
market. See Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12, 16-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), afid,
514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975); Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at
1369; Note, supra note 6, at 916-19. Despite the fact that the market is "efficient," see
note 160, infra, it thus apparently discounts some stocks for reasons having nothing to
do with the value of the issuer's income stream.
81. Cf. Brudney, supra note 5, at 1026-30. Since the economic gain, if any,
resulting from going private is appropriated by those who remain shareholders, the
ordinary deference to the business judgment of those in control is not in order. Id.
[Vol. 49
14
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 3 [1984], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol49/iss3/3
FREEZE-OUT MERGERS
perform the management function. It is too diverse and diffuse. Indeed, even if
it were possible to put matters of investment strategy to a vote, it would not be
a reliable way of proposing investment strategies.82
It might be suggested, however, that a veto of policies that do not serve
the interests perceived by outside shareholders could work. The stock market
serves, in a sense, as a continuing referendum on management's policies. Al-
though the shareholders cannot propose the kind of investment or payout strat-
egy they prefer, if management pays enough attention to the market's move-
ments it will eventually divine the shareholders' desires. Again, this ignores the
competing financial interest of the majority and, as will be seen in more detail,
using the stock market as an indicator of minority preferences may be quite
misleading.8 3
All of this argues that freeze-outs can be justified even in the absence of
operating efficiencies. Freeze-outs invariably involve substantial premiums over
market price being paid to minority shareholders." The minority receives
more for its stock than it could otherwise hope to realize over the short term.",
This seems to be precisely what the minority has been demanding, increased
dividends, albeit in a lump sum payment. Of course one must also believe the
majority thinks the stock is worth more than it is paying. That alone, however,
hardly argues that freeze-outs constitute questionable advantage taking by
majorities. Disparate perceptions of value are a prerequisite to any transac-
tion.86 In short, if arm's length bargaining were possible, minorities would
often freely agree to be frozen out.
It has been argued, too, that it is unfair for a company to go public at a
high price and to freeze out its public shareholders after the market has fallen.
That amounts, it is argued, to the company's selling short its own stock.8 7 It is
far from clear, however, that there is any real loss to a frozen-out shareholder
merely because the stock market as a whole has fallen.8 This means only that
82. The impropriety of using a system of voting to make investment deci-
sions-where there are typically many more than three alternatives-is amply demon-
strated by Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem. K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND
INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). But see G. TULLOCK, TOWARD A MATHEMATICS OF
POLITICS 37-49 (1967). One could favor a negotiating committee (as the Weinberger
court suggested for protecting minority rights in freeze-outs) but there is no reason to
believe that an adversary setting fosters the development of more profitable investment
policies. The very fact that the idea seems to make some sense at first suggests that
some of the legal thinking about corporations suffers from the fact that it is done by
lawyers.
83. See text at notes 151-59, infra.
84. Chazen, supra note 46, at 1445 n.26; DeAngelo, DeAngelo & Rice, Going
Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, 27 J. L. & EcON. 367 (1984).
85. See Chazen, supra note 46, at 1449-50.
86. See, e.g., Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 394 (1979)
(on remand).
87. Note, supra note 5, at 905-06.
88. The possibility of significant insider gains from public issue at a high price
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equities have become relatively less valuable in the market.89 As one con-
cerned primarily with investment or trading and not participation in manage-
ment, it is a virtually complete response to the minority shareholder that he
can use the money to buy an equally good but equally depressed investment.90
On the other hand, why should the insider, whose interest is primarily in long
term management rather than short term trading gains 91 be forced to accept
the market's view of the relative value of his equity interest? The very fact
that market conditions change and investments fall into or out of favor tends
to show that an insider may validly disagree with the minority over a com-
pany's worth.92 Indeed, there may be other markets in which equities are more
valuable, such as the market for whole corporations. 3 It is no answer that the
insider bargained away his privilege to deal in other markets for the liquidity
and a freeze-out at a lower price has often been noted. See Tanzer v. International
Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 392-93 (1979); Brudney, supra note 5, at 1019; Note,
supra note 6, at 905-06. The argument was properly rejected in Kaufmann v. Law-
rence, 386 F. Supp. 12, 16-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), af'd, 514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975),
where the court noted that a tender offer price of roughly half the public issue price
two years earlier was attractive only because of market conditions.
89. For example, in litigation under the federal securities acts, it has been held
that when a broker engages in excessive trading for (churns) an investor's account, the
investor may recover his loss, but only to the extent it exceeds its decline in the market
as a whole. The market's decline is measured by a broad based market index such as
the Dow Jones Industrial Average. See, e.g., Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570
F.2d 38, 49 n.22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
90. Commentators have distinguished transactions in which the shareholder is
forced to accept cash from those in which he is allowed to retain his investment. Cha-
zen, supra note 46, at 1460-62; Note, supra note 5, at 929-30; see also In re Valuation
of Common Stock of Libby, McNeil & Libby, 406 A.2d 54 (Me. 1979). However, if
one believes in the efficient market one believes that one share of stock is as good as
another. See generally J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES
AND EVIDENCE 70-98 (1973). Thus, except that the shareholder is put to the cost of
acquiring substitute investments, he should be indifferent, whether a willing seller or
not, if one analyzes the issue purely in terms of market conditions. Moreover, it is well
established that, through diversification, an investor can eliminate all risk except mar-
ket risk without any sacrifice of return. See generally id. It would seem then that any
bonus received from a freeze-out is pure windfall and that the investor needs little if
any protection. It is argued below, however, that it is in the nature of a share of stock
to be worth more as an investment than as a trading commodity and that freeze-outs
are mutually beneficial because they allow extraction of the additional value unavaila-
ble in the market. Thus in analyzing freeze-outs one should not focus on the loss of
value to the shareholder. The premium can be recouped by buying another issue, al-
though there would be some cost in identifying comparable investments. Rather the law
should (and often does) focus on the possibility of unjust gain to the insider. See note
130, infra. What is lost to the shareholder is the ability to get the premium in the form
of cash, at best a shareholder's right only in extreme circumstances.
91. See Borden, supra note 3, at 1006-08.
92. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 80-81 (1976).
93. See generally Chazen, supra note 46; Mirvis, Two Tier Pricing: Some Ap-
praisal and "Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAw. 485 (1983).
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of public trading. The value he perceived has since been destroyed.94
Finally, on a macroeconomic scale, it would seem clearly preferable to
allow for the redeployment of unused capital. The fact that a company is al-
ready controlled by an investor who desires a bigger stake should not stand in
the way of deal that would benefit both parties. The majority shareholder is
the most likely purchaser because he knows the business and his own manage-
ment capabilities. It seems foolish to insist that just because a company once
goes public it must forever remain public because of potential conflicts of in-
terest in the majority's purchase.95 Not only do the shareholders lose their only
chance to get out at a premium, 8 the remainder of the economy loses the use
of investment funds locked in the subsidiary that cannot be taken private.97
Viewed in this light, a freeze-out not only may be justified but the major-
ity may actually have a duty to carry it out. A freeze-out amounts to the
declaration of an increased (one-time) dividend to those who demand it, leav-
ing control of the company to those who believe it is optimally directed.
Though there may be shareholders in the minority who agree with the major-
ity's management strategy and would prefer to remain shareholders, the ma-
jority may be justifiably leery of allowing any minority to remain. There can
be no guarantees that the disagreement will not recur.
All this is not to say that majorities cannot abuse their powers. Thus,
although Weinberger eliminates the business purpose requirement, liberalizes
the appraisal remedy, and holds that ordinarily appraisal should be the exclu-
sive remedy in freeze-out cases, it also preserves the power of the courts of
equity in cases of fraud, misrepresentation, self-dealing, waste, and overreach-
ing.98 Arguably, this was already the rule under Harman. As the court held in
Harman, coercion is an essential element of self-dealing and thus of the cause
of action at equity.99 In distinguishing an earlier trial court opinion in Wein-
berger,100 the Harman court strongly suggested that a fairly conducted vote
might well justify dismissal of a plaintiff's claim without a trial,""' though the
94. For example, if a 100% shareholder sold 4 of his 10 shares at the market for
$10 per share and froze out the public after the market price had fallen to $5, the
public would have lost $20 but the parent would have lost $30 in the market value of
the shares retained. The company of course would be $20 ahead in cash, after the
freeze-out, though it might take some time to live down the market's opinion. To the
extent that it is appropriate to think of freeze-outs more in terms of the implicit con-
tract between management and shareholders, it may also be appropriate to think of
such circumstances as these as failure of consideration.
95. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3rd. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 999 (1981).
96. Chazen, supra, note 46, at 1449-50.
97. See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1369.
98. 457 A.2d at 714.
99. Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, 442 A.2d 487, 495-96 (Del. 1982).
100. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 409 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 1979).
101. 442 A.2d at 495. It is ironic, to say the least, that Weinberger should have
been used to establish this principle.
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court did note that the Chancellor in Weinberger also held that merely giving
the minority a vote was no safe harbor. 102
There is no self-dealing when the majority does not use its control to as-
sure that the transaction will occur, for example, when the minority is afforded
a veto. Since Harman, it was arguable that litigation had already been con-
fined to situations where either no vote was taken or the vote was somehow
tainted. Weinberger uses the device of shifting the burden of proof to the
plaintiffs rather than negating the existence of self-dealing. But in practice the
two methods differ little. Weinberger reiterates and clarifies the elements of a
cause of action, but the rules set down are certainly not new.
The utility of a shareholder vote to assure that the majority has set a fair
price should not be underestimated. Only by putting the matter of a freeze-out
to a preliminary vote can coercion be eliminated. Even in a tender offer by the
parent for the minority shares there are subtle but powerful pressures that
coerce a shareholder to accept less than he thinks his stock is worth. If he does
not tender he may be frozen out at a still lower price.1 13 Voting eliminates this
problem by preserving the shareholder's option to express his opinion that the
price is too low without having to forego realizing the offered price if it turns
out that most shareholders think it is adequate. The problem with relying on
voting, of course, is that shareholders are notorious for not taking their
franchise seriously.104 It is not clear how much of that notoriety is deserved. 10 5
There is no reason to believe that shareholders will not take notice once they
realize that the vote in connection with a freeze-out should be treated as a
decision to sell or hold at the proposed price.10
It bears noting that Weinberger does not require that a vote be taken.
Cases may arise in which no vote is taken if, for some reason, the parent
believes the shareholders would not behave rationally or if damaging disclo-
sures unrelated to the fairness of the transaction were required to be made.
The Weinberger court may have had such cases in mind when it suggested
that the appointment of a special committee of independent directors to nego-
102. Id. at n.14. Nevertheless it quickly became standard practice for the major-
ity to call a vote of the minority in connection with a proposed freeze-out. See Deutsch,
Weinberger v. UOP, Analysis of a Dissent, 6 CORP. L. REV. 29, 34 (1983). The Wein-
berger complaint was amended to allege misrepresentation in connection with the vote
and was held to state a cause of action in the decision which was reversed on the merits
by the Delaware Supreme Court. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del Ch.
1981), rev'd, 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
103. See e.g. Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), affd,
514 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1975).
104. See Weiss, supra note 7, at 676-77.
105. See M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 37-63 (1976).
106. See id. at 66-68. A greater danger may be the inclination of institutional
investors---often the largest shareholders in a corporation-to vote in favor of a quick
profit even though they believe the investment value of the stock to be greater than the
proposed price. See id. at 53-63; Borden, supra note 3, at 1015.
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tiate a price will be looked upon with favor.107
In addition to dangling before parents the prospect of avoiding litigation,
Weinberger increases the pressure that an informed vote be taken in every
freeze-out transaction so that the majority can know how many potential ap-
praisal-seekers there will be.108 It would not be surprising if most freeze-outs
hereafter are made dependent on a maximum number of "no" votes.' 09 As-
suming that there is some chance, even in fairly approved mergers, that dis-
senters will be awarded additional compensation, majorities will likely seek
assurance that the number of shareholders seeking appraisal be kept to a mini-
mum. 10 The majority will have a further incentive to put the matter up to a
vote since only those voting "no" have a right to an appraisal."' Finally, the
majority will likely want to leave open the option of calling off the freeze-out
if the risk of having to pay a high price becomes too great.
Hazards abound here, however. Establishing any maximum number of
"no" votes is some indication that there is some higher price which the major-
ity would be willing to pay."' Moreover, read broadly, Weinberger appears to
require that the majority disclose its view of the value of the subsidiary or, at
the very least, the amount it is willing to pay if greater than the amount being
offered."1 ' It was precisely such facts which were not disclosed in Weinberger
and which left the minority vote without force.
14
107. 457 A.2d at 709 & n.7; see Getty Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883,
886 (Del. 1970); Johnston v. Greene, 121 A.2d 919, 925 (Del. 1956); Puma v. Marri-
ott, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. Ch. 1971). The weight to be accorded such negotiations is
unsettled, but may approach a presumption of fairness equivalent to a merger being
protected by the business judgment rule. See text at note 81, supra; see also Chazen,
supra, note 46, at 1440-41, 1474-77. The committee device could be used as a means of
giving the minority some voice in proposing a price, thereby obviating the criticism that
shareholder voting is at best an awkward substitute for negotiations.
108. The Delaware appraisal statute requires that a dissenter notify the corpora-
tion in advance of his intent to seek appraisal. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(d) (1983).
Thus, in fact, a vote need never be taken to determine if there will be too many
dissenters.
109. The practice is not uncommon anyway. See, e.g., Tanzer Economic Assocs.,
v. Haynie, 388 F.Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Eisenberg, supra note 92, at 72.
110. It is argued below, however, that additional compensation should never be
awarded in a fairly approved merger. See text at notes 186-210, infra.
1I1. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(a) (1983).
112. On the other hand, recklessly foregoing the opportunity to make the trans-
action contingent upon a particular percentage of "no" votes, would seem to suggest
that the majority would pay any price.
113. To a large degree such disclosure is already required inasmuch as virtually
all publicly held companies are required to disclose information about future prospects
and firm offers to be bought in connection with "going private" transactions. General
Rules and Regulations, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3e-100
(items 5, 8) (1983). See Chazen, supra note 46, at 1441-41, 1451-52; Tanzer Eco-
nomic Assocs. v. Haynie, 388 F. Supp. 365, 366-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); see also R. JEN-
NINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 628-30, 957-60 (5th ed. 1982).
114. 457 F.2d at 712.
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It seems highly unlikely that the Weinberger court intended to require the
majority to bare its innermost thoughts on the value of the minority interest.
No clear-thinking shareholder would vote "yes" if he knew the parent was
willing to pay more. But no parent would pay every last cent of the value of
the minority stock either. Unless there is some profit left in the transaction,
the parent will not propose it. Since no one else can, both sides stand to lose.
It can only be concluded that the holding in Weinberger turned on the
fact that the information was obtained from sources inside the subsidiary.115 If
the parent is motivated by its own perceptions, analysis, and plans, and not by
inside information obtained through its privileged position in the subsidiary, it
must be presumed that disclosure is not required. Otherwise, Weinberger
amounts to a disingenious ban on freeze-outs.
Thus it appears under Weinberger, the parent is free to pursue its own
interest and to use its own information within the confines of fair dealing.
Although the legitimacy of a majority shareholder's pursuing its own self in-
terest may be traced back to the Delaware courts' adoption in Singer and
subsequent cases of a competing interests analysis of fiduciary duty rather
than the traditionally rigid one, the significance of Weinberger is that it recog-
nizes the possibility of mutually beneficial freeze-outs, while the business pur-
pose test may well have precluded some transactions profitable to both parties.
III. APPRAISAL AFrER Weinberger
Harman had already accomplished virtually as much as Weinberger in
refining the elements of the minority's cause of action. The innovation in
Weinberger, other than the obvious improvements in the method of appraisal,
may thus appear to be that a higher price may be exacted through appraisal
even though the merger has been approved by a minority vote. This is strongly
suggested by the court's attitude that now that appraisal comports with real-
world valuation, the dissenter has nothing to fear."16 Moreover, one would nat-
urally think that since a dissenter may introduce new kinds of evidence and
have new kinds of values compensated, he will clearly be better off. Since the
dissenter may be holding out simply because he thinks his stock is worth more
than is offered, he no doubt will sometimes be correct even in the absence of
fraud.
On reflection, however, it seems highly unlikely that the court intended
any of this to mean that a dissenter could do better even in a fairly approved
transaction. Discussing the recent amendments to the Delaware appraisal stat-
ute, the court emphasizes that fairness includes both fair price and fair dealing
and that the two cannot be split apart.17 It would seem impossible, given such
an emphatic statement, for an appraiser to ignore an informed vote of the
115. 457 F.2d at 709.
116. See text at note 51, supra.
117. 457 A.2d at 711.
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minority as bearing on fairness. What would be found fair in litigation should
also be found fair in appraisal. 1
18
This position is further supported by the court's holding that rescissory
damages may be allowed in an appraisal proceeding if appropriate.11 9 Thus the
court had in mind cases in which fraud is discovered in the course of appraisal.
However, the equivalent of rescissory damages could be awarded simply by
using the new forms of evidence recognized by the Weinberger court. This
reinforces the conclusion that a fairly approved transaction does not call for
any such award, since otherwise it is difficult to understand how such an
award could be said to be discretionary.
Finally, the Weinberger court could not have intended for arm's length
acquirers to face the possibility of having to pay dissenters more than the ap-
proved price. Nevertheless, the appraisal remedy applies to all mergers, not
just to interested mergers. Whatever claim the minority may have to the gain
a parent expects from a freeze-out, the dissenting shareholder' in an arm's
length merger certainly has none. 2
In short, while at first the expansive notion of fairness outlined in Wein-
berger makes it appear that dissenters will now receive compensation for all
sorts of value previously lost to them, fair dealing cuts both ways. If the price
is fairly set, what justification can there be for changing it? By drawing so
heavily on the appraisal statute for the meaning of fairness in the context of
litigation, the court also insures that fairness in one context will be set by the
same standards as in the other. Given the virtual identity of the two methods
of proceeding after Weinberger, it is difficult to reach any conclusion other
than that, unless grounds for litigation can be found, the appraiser will award
the parent's proposed price if ratified in a fair vote of the minority sharehold-
ers. Thus, appraisal may well become the procedure of choice by plaintiffs,
since they need not fear dismissal and will at the very least enjoy a cursory
review of the terms of the transaction.12 1
No doubt there will be a flurry of appraisal proceedings in the near future
to test the water. While it is doubtful that the Delaware court intended for
appraisers freely to set new prices, it certainly appears that the liberalized
appraisal proceeding was intended to be readily available to shareholders who
118. See also Mirvis, supra note 93, at 498-500; Weiss, supra note 7, at 671.
119. 457 A.2d at 714.
120. See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1359-62.
121. This may well raise difficult procedural problems. Presumably, a finding of
coercion will nullify any vote taken as in Weinberger itself. But if the coercion is found
in an appraisal proceeding it is unclear how "yes" voters may then proceed. May they
be deemed "no" voters by avoidance of the election? Must they begin a parallel action
at equity? Will the availability of rescissory damages via appraisal and the possibility
of an inconsistent result at equity create pressure for equitable relief or will collateral
estoppel apply? Questions such as these have not arisen in the past since litigation has
always been the preferred route when it could be supported. Regarding the peculiar
procedures and pitfalls of appraisal, see generally Eisenberg, supra note 92, at 69-84;
see also Weiss, supra, note 52, at 256-60.
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simply want to keep their investments. There are compelling reasons beyond
the mere definition of fairness why courts should refuse to allow dissenters any
additional compensation when the merger has been fairly approved. These rea-
sons lie in the very nature of the new forms of evidence recognized in
Weinberger.
Weinberger allows dissenters to introduce three new forms of evidence:
(1) discounted cash flows, (2) premiums paid in comparable transactions, and
(3) non-speculative post-merger gains. In addition, a shareholder who dissents
from a merger may also seek "rescissory damages." '22 In order to understand
fully the implications of the new appraisal remedy it is necessary to under-
stand this fourth element of potential compensation.
A. Rescissory Damages
Rescissory damages are the rough monetary equivalent of an award of
rescission following a trial. They are calculated by determining what the plain-
tiff would have had if he had been allowed to keep his stock.123 If the stock has
increased in value since the freeze-out, the plaintiff gets the difference. He
does not get his stock back as that would be rescission itself. He loses any
unforeseeable future gains. The remedy is somewhat less harsh than rescission
because the transaction is allowed to stand, but the plaintiff is awarded the
benefit of the bargain, rather than being left only with his out of pocket loss at
the time of the transaction.
The value of the stock under a rescissory damages formula is determined
at the time of trial. As a result, it reflects upswings in the market, turns for
the better in the fortunes of the company, and changes in the business wrought
by the acquiring company. This is particularly significant in the context of a
freeze-out since the essence of a plaintiff's case is not that he has suffered a
loss, but rather that he has not enjoyed a gain. The old appraisal remedy ad-
dressed only the former. 2'
In Weinberger, plaintiff sought rescissory damages as had been awarded
in Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp. 25 In Lynch, the parent made a tender offer
at $12 per share to the minority. The parent failed to disclose, however, that
an analyst had determined that the stock was worth "significantly more" and
that the parent had authorized open market purchases at up to $15 per share.
The minority alleged breach of fiduciary duty and sued for damages or rescis-
sion. The chancellor conducted the equivalent of an appraisal and concluded
122. 457 A.2d at 714.
123. See generally 4 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIs FRAUD &
COMMODITIEs FRAUD § 9.1 (1983).
124. See Chazen, supra note 46, at 1443-47.
125. 351 A.2d 570 (Del. Ch. 1976), rev'd, 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1977) (Lynch I),
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that $12 was a fair price at the time of the tender offer.126
The Delaware Supreme Court reversed, holding that, while the minority
was entitled to rescission as a matter of law, rescission was impractical.
Rather, the minority should be awarded the value of the stock at the time of
trial.127 The court stated that rescission is the preferable remedy when a party
has been induced to contract by materially misleading representations. 28 The
court noted that such a rule of damages is consistent with the notion that a
fiduciary should not be allowed to profit at the expense of the principal.1 29 '
Thus, the court held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to show that he
had been injured. He need only show that the defendant had benefited.1 30
The Lynch holding was criticized for confining the discretion of the chan-
cellor. 13 Indeed, there appears to be little basis on which to distinguish Lynch
from any case in which the stock acquired by a parent through tender offer or
freeze-out appreciated in value. Certainly there is no basis for distinction in
any case where the parent knew of the hidden value at the time.1 32
Weinberger overruled Lynch to the extent that it purported to impose a
specific damage formula. 3 In other words, Lynch was overruled insofar as it
could be interpreted to require a rescissory damages formula to be applied
when unfairness was found. The Weinberger decision reaffirms the discretion
of the chancellor to award rescissory damages in a trial and extends that dis-
cretion to appraisal proceedings.1 ' Thus, whether through litigation or ap-
praisal, the chancellor may in appropriate cases award the benefit of the bar-
gain, the value ultimately realized by the parent.
One may think of rescissory damages as having grown out of the business
purpose test set down in Singer. Since freeze-outs could be accomplished
within the letter of the law, but were also self-interested, it fell to the courts of
equity to determine whether the transaction as a whole was fair. A freeze-out
differed from the traditional self-dealing transaction. For example, where a
126. 429 A.2d at 499-500.
127. Id. at 501-03.
128. Id. at 502-03; see also Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Johnson, 263
F.2d 748 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 885, (1959).
129. 429 A.2d at 503 n.5.
130. Id. at 503-04. The remedy is common in circumstances in which insider
misbehavior must be deterred. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) (causation of damage established under Rule
lob-5 where material information not disclosed by insider-traders); Diamond v.
Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969) (corporation
recovered losses avoided by insiders who traded on information obtained in fiduciary
capacity).
131. 429 A.2d at 507-08 (Quillen, J., dissenting).
132. See Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent
Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913, 929-35 (1982);
Mirvis, supra note 93, at 496-500.
133. 457 A.2d at 703-04.
134. Id. at 714.
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director sells a piece of property to the corporation, the chancellor's objective
would be to determine whether the transaction roughly approximated what
would have happened at arm's length.' 35 In such cases, self-dealing is merely a
red flag that indicates that one cannot necessarily depend on the director pur-
suing the corporation's interest. It is nevertheless entirely possible that the
transaction is in the interest of both parties.131
Freeze-outs were thought to be quite a different matter, at least under
Singer. They were viewed more like a divorce, a situation in which the inter-
ests of the minority and the majority somehow had come into irreconcilable
conflict. Unless the transaction were to be banned altogether, some test needed
to be devised to determine whether the majority's keeping of its investment
and forcing the minority to accept cash was justified. Thus, courts looked to
business purpose to determine whether some higher good justified the residual
unfairness implicit in the fact that the majority would never propose a transac-
tion unless it perceived some benefit in it."3 7
Even though business purpose became easy to demonstrate, the relief
available in courts of equity got ever broader. In Tanzer,138 the Delaware su-
preme court affirmed the chancellor's refusal to grant a preliminary injunction
based on his finding that a valid business purpose existed but ordered a fair-
ness hearing anyway. Later, in Roland International Corp. v. Najjar,139 the
court held that a complaint requesting money damages only would suffice. The
court explained this holding in Harman,14 0 saying that the focus should be on
the nature of the coercion of shareholders, rather than the damage they may
have suffered. Translated, this means that the measure of damages available
at law focused on the harm to plaintiffs judged by the value of what they gave
up. At equity, on the other hand, the court could look at the benefit appropri-
ated by defendants measured by the value to the defendants.1 4 1
135. See, e.g., Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
136. See, e.g., Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
137. But see Weiss, supra note 7, at 660-63 (argues that the purpose test was
adopted primarily as an excuse to review the fairness of freeze-out mergers). In con-
trast, the position taken here is that the business purpose test did indeed fit the freeze-
out situation for a time, but that its very application (or misapplication) altered its
definition. See note 5, supra and text accompanying notes 219-20, infra.
138. Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977).
139. 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979).
140. Harman v. Masoneilan Int'l, 442 A.2d 487 (Del. 1981).
141. Although it is fairly clear that a plaintiff must prove the defendant's intent
in order to recover damages at law, it is not clear whether such a showing is necessary
at equity to recover the benefit of the bargain from defendants. See Lynch v. Vickers
Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 501 (Del. 1981) (Lynch II). Indeed, the Delaware court
may have left the matter unresolved intentionally in order to provide a potential rem-
edy, when necessary, for the subtle coercion often inherent in tender offers. See Kauf-
mani v. Lawrence, 386 F.Supp. 12, 16-17, aff'd, 514 F.2d 283 (2nd Cir. 1974). In this
sense, the Lynch court's reliance on the existence of a fiduciary duty as a trigger for
potential rescissory damages is quite accurate. Cf. Fischel, supra note 132, at 923-33;
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Weinberger affirms the availability of rescissory damages in both litiga-
tion and appraisal. It clearly holds, however, that rescissory damages are an
optional, not a mandatory, measure of damages. 42 No other rule would be
reasonable. Rescissory damages are the value of the freeze-out to the parent.
If it is determined that the freeze-out never would have occurred but for coer-
cion or non-disclosure, any lesser measure of damage would be a parent's li-
cense to steal. Note that the mere possibility of such damages is further reason
to believe that virtually all freeze-outs will now be put to a vote.
On the other hand, rescissory damages may be too harsh a remedy in
some cases. Weinberger itself is a good example. The parent would have been
willing to pay $24 per share and the minority, which overwhelmingly approved
$21, would clearly have voted for the higher price. Thus, with full disclosure
the transaction would have occurred. But this does not necessarily define the
value the parent placed on the minority stock. It could have been that the
parent's goal was a 15% return. At $24, the parent had calculated it would
realize a 15.5% return. 42 The value of the stock to the parent would thus have
been higher than $24 and an award of rescissory damages would presumably
be based on such a higher price.14 4
The fact that rescissory damages might be excessive does not mean that
the court must retreat to some sort of intrinsic worth measure like that calcu-
lated in the traditional appraisal proceeding.145 Again, Weinberger is a good
Mirvis, supra note 93, at 500. Indeed, while Lynch even as revised (and possibly Wein-
berger itself) will undoubtedly block some tender offers (and freeze-outs), the formulae
for damages appear now to be as finely tuned as possible to catch only those transac-
tions that would not have occurred had all the facts been known or would be so damag-
ing to the fiber of corporation law that relief would otherwise increase or preserve
wealth, by, for example, maintaining a higher level of confidence in the financial mar-
ket in general.
142. 457 A.2d at 714.
143. Id. at 709.
144. In deciding whether to make a particular investment (whether in a single
machine or an entire company) the essence of the analysis undertaken by a corporation
is the same as that used by an individual: does the return on the investment exceed the
cost of the capital to be invested? J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 71, at 291-
302. The answer is often difficult to calculate for a corporation. It is difficult to tell
what the corporation's cost of capital is because part of the "payment" to investors is
made in the form of growth and because the risk that investors perceive simultaneously
affects the amount of total dividend they demand. Id. at 796-801; see also V. BRUDNEY
& M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATION FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 429-38 (2d ed
1979). Partly in order to cope with these difficulties of estimation, corporations typi-
cally set minimum acceptable rates of return to use internally in making investment
decisions. J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, at 295-98. The internal rate of return of a pro-
posed investment is calculated and if it exceeds the minimum it is given further consid-
eration. But unless one knows what the minimum is it is impossible to tell the "value"
of the investment, that is the amount of value it would add to the enterprise.
145. See Chazen, supra note 46, at 1443-44. See generally Nathan & Shapiro,
Legal Standard of Fairness of Merger Terms under Delaware Law, 2 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 44 (1977); Note, Valuation of Dissenter's Stock Under Appraisal Statutes, 79
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example. Inasmuch as the freeze-out in Weinberger would have been unobjec-
tionable at $24 per share, it seems fair to presume that $24 will be the most
that the parent will be required to pay when the litigation is concluded. Since
this may well be less than rescissory damages, it appears that the court had in
mind less severe measurements of damages too. One can only presume that the
new forms of evidence to be considered in appraisal proceedings-discounted
cash-flows, premiums in comparable transactions and post-merger gains-are
intended to give the courts the flexibility to arrive at compromise measure-
ments of damages.14 6
B. A Negotiating Model
How should the measure of damages be defined now that Weinberger is
the law? Weinberger specifies the variables but provides no express formula.
How is the court to know where to alight between the maximum and the mini-
mum when the facts are less clear than those in Weinberger itself? Indeed,
how clear are the facts in Weinberger? Should the trial court affirm an award
of $24 or is some other measure appropriate?
There are at least some clues to the answer in the decision. Weinberger
emphasizes fair dealing. It instructs the courts to abide by fully informed votes
of minorities or to look to alternatives such as negotiations conducted by inde-
pendent directors of the subsidiary. Where neither exists it requires reference
to comparable transactions, accepted methods of calculation and nonspecula-
tive gains from the transaction. In short, it appears to require the courts to
reconstruct the results of arm's length "negotiations" whether by fully in-
formed vote or by committee. 147
In order to reconstruct the effect of such a negotiation, one must start
with the bargaining positions of the two parties. From the majority's point of
view, a freeze-out will not be proposed unless it is a wise investment.148 That
is, the market price the majority is willing to pay must be less than the value
of the stock as perceived by the majority. If the stock is not worth something
HIARV. L. REv. 1453 (1966).
146. Of course rescissory damages, when they are appropriate, must be calcu-
lated. The new forms of evidence will be useful in that process. See text at note 70,
supra.
147. That the goal of fairness and appraisal proceedings should be to replicate
the outcome of arm's length negotiations is a fairly new notion. See Bell v. Kirby Lum-
ber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980); Chazen, Fiedman & Fellerstein, Premiums and
Liquidation Values: Their Effect on the Fairness of an Acquisition, I 1 INST. ON SEC.
REG. 143, 162-63 (Fleischer, Lipton & Stevenson, eds. 1980) (statement by Martin
Lipton); Mirvis, supra note 93. See generally Chazen, supra note 46. "Negotiations" is
broadly defined here to include shareholder ratification by fully informed vote. Many
would disagree that voting can be an adequate substitute for negotiation, see note 107
supra, but it has distinct advantages over every other method for obtaining shareholder
approval. See text at note 103, supra.
148. See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 394 (Del. 1979).
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more, the transaction will never occur; why have one's money in risky ventures
rather than cash? It is presumable, then, that there is a gap between the price
the majority is willing to pay and the majority's best guess as to the minimum
price the majority would accept for the stock if it were to turn around and sell
it.149
From the minority's point of view, its stock is clearly worth more than the
market price. In the first place, the market price is undoubtedly depressed
because of the majority's control. There is no potential for a take-over bid,
every possibility for the parent to appropriate opportunities equally exploitable
by both and a substantial chance that overreaching would be undetected. 150
Second, even if the market price were not distorted, the minority would
expect more. Market price reflects the perceptions of the most willing seller.
Presumably any shareholder who thought the stock was worth no more would
sell. The vast majority of stockholders must therefore believe their stock is
worth more than the market price. Thus, they must be offered a premium to
be induced to sell and the greater the percentage to be induced to sell the
greater the premium. 5' This proposition is not merely logical. It is borne out
by the fact that as shares are purchased on the open market and held out of
circulation the price rises. If all shareholders believed the market price re-
flected full value the price would not rise. That is evident when the purchaser
is an outsider, but also true when the issuer repurchases its own shares. If the
corporation paid out full value the repurchase would not affect any concentra-
tion of the remaining shareholders' participations.' 52
That most shareholders believe their shares to be worth more than market
price is also consistent with accepted investment theory. A rational investor
puts his money into stocks when the return on stocks exceeds other invest-
ments by more than enough to compensate for the additional risk.93 While it
149. The difference, at the very least, is the cost of making the transaction. But
in most cases the difference is probably greater since one would expect investment op-
portunities costing less than their value to arise with some frequency (though possibly
not often enough to use all available cash). Thus the majority would not likely opt for
any deal with a small margin of profit, unless of course infinite amounts of cash were
available. See note 168, infra.
150. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND
MATERIALS 689-92 (2d ed. 1979); Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares, supra note 20,
at 306 n.25; see also Chazen, supra note 46, at 1443-44.
151. J. WILLIAMS, THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT VALUE 11-16 (1938); see also
Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1359-61.
152. See generally V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 144, at 470-501.
The reverse process, issuing new stock, also supports the proposition. It is well settled
that most businesses must pay a slightly higher rate for each new dollar of financing.
See generally, J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 71, ch. 19. Translated, this
means that unless a company convinces the market that it will make a greater rate of
return (or be less risky) with new capital, it will not be able to sell the new stock except
at less than current prices.
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might be argued that buyers of stock do not require the inducement of more
value than they are paying for, on close analysis this reasoning is suspect.
Assuming the market is efficient,'5 why would a seller ever sell? Such a view
of the market may explain transactions resulting from money entering or exit-
ing the market, but it does not explain intra-market volume. In other words, in
order for the stock market to function there must be a range of values per-
ceived by traders and potential traders.' 55
The price of a share of stock reflects the stream of dividends it will gener-
ate. 5 If the value of the dividends is fully reflected the investor would not be
indifferent between taking the price and keeping the investment. One would
invariably opt for the former and eliminate any further risk. Keeping the
stock, however, indicates that the investor thinks the lump sum he could have
if he sold would best be invested right where it is. In short, the investor thinks
the dividends are worth more than the market price. 15
154. See note 160, infra.
155. It has been recognized by legal commentators that a fair price is within a
range of values rather than any unique value. Chazen, supra note 46, at 1454-55;
Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares, supra note 20, at 316. Indeed the mechanics by
which such ranges are expressed are at the very core of stock markets. In over the
counter markets, market-makers publish bid and offer quotes, typically spread by a
quarter to a full point. On exchanges, specialists are licensed stock by stock to maintain
a limit order book recording investor's instructions to buy or sell at prices below or
above the current market price. For a description of these systems, see Posner, Restruc-
turing the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56
N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 885-96 (1981). Thus it is hardly accurate to think of the market
price as a single number. It could be argued however that market price is an accurate
measure of value since it incorporates the perceptions not only of current shareholders
and traders but also of those who think the stock is overvalued by the market, that is,
potential purchasers at lower prices. The problem with crediting the pessimists' percep-
tions, however, is that they have nothing to sell. If the goal is to replicate a negotiation,
non-participants do not count. Economic theory too would seem to dictate ignoring
non-owners (except for the one negotiating to purchase); just as the transaction at hand
will maximize wealth (if both sides agree), the transaction in the past by which the
current owner became the current owner presumably maximized wealth.
156. See text accompanying note 70, supra.
157. This assumption should be distinguished from the "bird-in-the-hand" theory
that, other things being equal, investors prefer dividends. The assumption here is that
other things are not equal; investors on the average think their shares are worth more
than the supposed capitalized value of the dividends, that is, the market price. How-
ever, since investors cannot participate in such excess value (except in extraordinary
situations like tender offers and freeze-outs) they must indeed prefer dividends to noth-
ing at all unless they are convinced that the company can find investments returning
more than the current payout rate. No one seems to doubt that a company which can
find no investments even equal to the cost of capital should not retain any earnings.
The issue is what investors prefer when the new investment exactly equals the cost of
capital. Brudney & Chirelstein suggest without empirical support that this is the most
common situation. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 144 at 434. If, by and
large, corporations are efficiently managed that is probably a correct assumption; if
significantly higher returns were generally easily available to corporations, some would
show them and investors would demand them from all corporations. Such opportunities
544 [Vol. 49
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Thus, no stock transaction would ever occur, absent external inducements
(such as the investor's need for cash), unless both buyer and seller thought
they were getting something worth more than what they gave up. The fact
that traders pay commissions makes this all the more true.
Finally, it is logical to assume that a shareholder willing to wait to sell
will insist on a higher price for the same share of stock than a shareholder
who, for some reason, cannot or does not want to wait. A buyer, of course,
would expect to be able to buy from the latter seller at less than full value.
And anyone would be foolish to buy from anyone else. Liquidity has its
price. 158
One might argue that the focus here is on attributes of investors rather
than shares of stock. That is, however, as it should be. Shares of stock are
valuable only because investors want them. It is focusing too much on the
share of stock itself that blinds one to the fact that the same piece of paper
can have different values in different hands.25 9
must, therefore, be scarce and, thus, often as not, one would expect corporations to
decline lesser opportunities and have funds left over. See note 168, infra. Such a situa-
tion is consistent with and indeed suggested by portfolio theory. See note 160, infra.
For a sampling of the bird-in-the-hand controversy, compare Brudney, Dividends,
Discretion and Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REV. 85 (1980) with Fischel, The Law and Eco-
nomics of Dividend Policy, 67 VA. L. REv. 699 (1981). Fischel notes that empirical
studies have so far been inconclusive on the question of whether investors have a pref-
erence for dividends. It is difficult to imagine an empirical study that would be convinc-
ing on this point since it seems improbable that one could separate the effect of pure
investor preference from investor perceptions about the company's correctly choosing
among all possible avenues of investment. It seems much more likely that investors will
focus on longer range strategies, the talents of management and, perhaps, corporate
propaganda, and that this might well lead to a preference for stable policies, that is, a
preference for dividends from those who pay them and retention by those who do not.
See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 434 (1979). This phenom-
enon is akin to the clientele effect first hypothesized by Miller and Modigliani in Divi-
dend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares, 34 J. Bus. 411, 431 (1961). See J.
WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 71, at 800-01; Fischel, supra, at 704-06.
158. Cf. J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra note 71, at 653. This is not particu-
larly surprising. It has long been known that investors who buy and hold a portfolio of
stocks do better over the long run than those who trade. Fama, Random Walks in
Stock Market Prices, FIN. ANALYST J., Sept.-Oct. 1965, at 55-60. See generally V.
BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN supra note 144, at 1177-93.
159. See P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS & G. DONALDSON, BASIC BUSINESS FINANCE: A
TEXT 548-59 (4th ed., 1971); J. WESTON & C. BRIGHAM, supra note 71, at 627-33.
There are also a number of less theoretical (and less basic) reasons why investors
may attach different values to the same stock. Probably the most important is taxes;
investors who purchased at a price significantly different from the market price will be
concerned with recognizing gains or losses for tax purposes at a time peculiar to their
own situations. See Chazen, supra note 46, at 1457-59. In general, the greater the gain
already imbedded in the market price of his shares, the more the shareholder will de-
mand (the converse is true for losses). It is presumable that the length of time the
average shareholder has held is correlated. See Fischel, supra note 157, at 704-06.
Efficient market theory together with portfolio theory suggest that these effects
may be quite strong. The efficient market theory leads to the conclusion that most
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All of this is not to say that the market is somehow inaccurate or ineffi-
cient.160 It is only to say that trading prices and investment values differ.
Trading prices are naturally lower. This fact justifies appraisal prices that dif-
fer from market prices, though the reasoning seldom appears in the
decisions."'
investors stand no chance of beating the market because of superior research. Thus it
may be that they must be offered a significant premium in order to pay any attention
to a tender offer. Portfolio theory teaches that through diversification an investor can
eliminate all risk peculiar to a particular stock and thus must suffer only the risk that
the market will rise or fall as a whole. If that is the case, all stocks of a particular risk
level are of equal value as investments in a portfolio. Thus, factors such as tax conse-
quences will have a greater effect than one might think from looking at stocks one at a
time. Moreover, seemingly minute preferences for payout policies that minimize a
shareholder's transaction costs may wax important. Note that all of these effects tend
to justify the competing interests analysis of fiduciary duty and the institution of
freeze-outs in that they minimize the rational investor's attachment to any particular
stock and maximize his personal motivations.
160. It is generally believed, at least among theorists, that the stock market is
"efficient," that is that stock prices (and indeed the prices of all capital instruments)
change virtually instantaneously to reflect all available information. Probably the most
important implication of this hypothesis is that the average investor (or analyst for that
matter) cannot even hope to identify undervalued (or overvalued) stocks. It follows
that, at a given level of return, one stock is as good as another as an investment. Portfo-
lio theory-which is perhaps even more widely accepted-holds that through diversifi-
cation one can eliminate virtually all risk of better or worse than expected returns from
a particular company. Taken together the two theories indicate that a rational investor
should do no more than identify the level of return and market risk he desires and buy
a portfolio of stocks with such characteristics. For a concise explanation of the theories,
see J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-110
(1973); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the
Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REV. 1031 (1977). See also V.
BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 144, at 1143-1235.
Nothing about efficient market theory necessarily entails that all investors accept
the same price as correct. The theory has instead to do with establishing the equilib-
rium between supply and demand of particular shares and, thus, presumes range of
values. Indeed, the theory holds that prices will move randomly about the "correct"
price. See J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, supra, at 70-97. While the theory does eventu-
ally lead to the conclusion that the rational investor should not concern himself with
the peculiarities of individual stocks, it does not entail either (1) that the rational in-
vestor ignore the level of the market as a whole (or even of particular risk categories)
or (2) that once an offer of some sort has been made, the shareholder should not even
attempt to analyze it to determine if the price is adequate. Efficient market theory
seems to suggest that whenever a better than market price can be had one should take
it. See, e.g. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1175-82 (1981); Takeover
Bids, Defensive Tactics and Shareholder's Welfare, 36 Bus. Law 1733, 1741-43
(1981). But tender offers and freeze-outs are hardly run-of-the-mill stock market trans-
actions. They are, at the least, focal points for the market. See V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 144, at 1191-93. Indeed, the activity of arbitrageurs in con-
nection with such quasi-market offers implies that they pay close attention to every
increment in the offered price and investors' valuations. See id. at 732-34.
161. But see, e.g., In re Valuation of Common Stock of Libby, McNeil & Libby,
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Applying these principles to the matter at hand, in any fairly negotiated
freeze-out that is consummated it may be presumed that there is a gap be-
tween the (higher) parent's maximum price and the (lower) minimum price
demanded by the minority.162 If this were not the case, no agreement would
ever be reached. Parties bargaining at arm's length could well settle on any
price in between the parent's maximum price and the minority's minimum
price, and any such price could be said to be fair.16 3 The problem with freeze-
outs, of course, is that the parent is on both sides of the transaction and may
406 A.2d 54 (Me. 1979) (trial court lowered appraiser's weighting of market price on
grounds that it represented price that would be accepted by willing seller; appraiser's
weighting was reinstated on appeal). Such reasoning may also explain why in one nota-
ble case dissenters obtained more by appraisal than did shareholders who sued and lost
even though one judge presided over both proceedings. Compare David J. Greene &
Co. v. Schenley Indus., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971) (fairness trial; $29 per share fair)
with Gibbons v. Schenley Indus., 339 A.2d 460 (Del. Ch. 1975) (appraisal; $33.86
found as fair value). This potential bias in favor of appraisal is replicated by the nature
of the proceeding; in a fairness trial the burden is on one of the parties to prove fairness
or unfairness whereas in appraisal the court is charged affirmatively to find a fair price.
See also P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS & G. DONALDSON, supra note 159, at 557-59 (distin-
guishing between market values and fair or intrinsic values).
For a time legal scholars leaned heavily toward limiting appraisal to situations in
which there was no reliable market price. See Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal
Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 260-62 (1962). Indeed, the
Delaware appraisal statute itself for a while applied only to corporations neither traded
on a national exchange nor having 2000 shareholders. Implicit in this provision was the
belief that market price is adequate compensation when the market is reliable. Since
1976, however, the exception has applied only to share-for-share exchanges and hence
does not affect the remedy in the context of a freeze-out. The .assumption remains
subject to question even in the share-for-share exchange, however. Although the share-
holder is not forced to forego investment value altogether, he may well be more opti-
mistic about his original investment than about the one he is receiving in exchange.
Undoubtedly the acquiring company is. If the shareholder elects to sell he will then
incur brokerage fees and may end up worse off than if the merger had been for cash.
Arguably, the Delaware court recognized such potential fairness challenges in Harman
v. Masoneilan Int'l, 442 A.2d 487 (Del. 1982). See note 60, supra. A similar restriction
was removed from §§ 80 and 81 of the Model Business Corporation Act. See Changes
in the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights, A Report of the
Committee on Corporate Laws, 32 Bus. LAW. 1855, 1859-78 (1977), Conard, Amend-
ments of the Model Business Corporation Act Affecting Dissenters' Rights (Sections
73, 74, 80, and 81) 33 Bus. LAW. 2587, 2592-93 (1978). The rationale for removal was
that merger activity and the attendant premiums had cast doubt on the reliability of
market prices generally. See also Brudney, Efficient Markets and Fair Values in Par-
ent Subsidiary Mergers, 4 J. OF CORP. L. 63 (1978); Note, A Reconsideration of the
Stock Market Exception to the Dissenting Shareholders' Rights of Appraisal, 74
MICH. L. REv. 1023 (1976).
162. For ease this "price" is sometimes hereafter referred to as the minority's
"investment value price." It should be kept in mind however that no single price is
implied. Rather the value varies according to the percentage of the minority interest
sought.
163. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares, supra note 20, at 315-16 (1974).
1984]
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be expected to opt for the lowest defensible fair price.16
One might also expect the minority to settle for less than they would in a
true arm's length negotiation in order to eliminate the potential for exploita-
tion and the attendant lessened return. However the availability of appraisal
probably eliminates this effect; as long as the courts can do a credible job of
calculating investment value, i.e. the price at which the median minority
shareholder would willingly sell, minority shareholders can expect to receive
full investment value in a freeze-out merger. 165 Indeed only then can they ex-
pect it, which strongly argues that investment value-and not the naturally
lower market price-would be the lower limit in any negotiation.
It is helpful to view the situation graphically. The variety of potentially
"fair" prices may be thought of as points along a spectrum as shown in Figure
1.
Price Increasing •
A B C D D' EI I I I I I
I I I I II
Actual I Investment | Parent's Other
Market Value I Value Acquirer's




Price A, the actual market price of the subsidiary's or minority's stock, is
unrealistically low. The market has discounted it because of the danger of
undetected unfair treatment, the inadequacy of remedies if it is detected per-
haps, and the recognition that the subsidiary or minority will never be bid for
by any one other than the parent or majority because a controlling group owns
more than 50%.
Price B, the constructive market price, is what the price of the minority
stock would be absent the depressing factors. Presumably this could be esti-
mated by reference to other similar companies or by discounting cash flow and
164. Indeed, courts sometimes seem to conclude that they are powerless to rem-
edy this sort of advantage-taking by parents. For example, in Levin v. Great W. Sugar
Co., 406 F.2d 1112 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 848 (1969) the court held that the
minority was entitled to a proportionate benefit from the merger, but ultimately ap-
proved the terms as "not obviously unfair." See also Chazen, supra note 46, at 1444-
45.
165. The courts are quite willing to scrutinize the reliability of market prices,
even though they rely on them, perhaps to excess, when they are found to be undis-
torted. See M. EISENBERG, supra note 92, at 70; Chazen supra note 46, at 1443-44;
Weiss, supra note 7, at 662.
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choosing the most pessimistic price since market price reflects the perception
of the most willing seller of shares. This is the minimum "fair" price. Share-
holders could never expect to get more on the market. Indeed, often as not,
appraisers have relied heavily on any available evidence of undistorted market
price.Y66
Price C is the "investment value" of the stock. To label it tells nothing of
how it would be calculated. But one may be certain of its relative magnitude
in any situation in which a deal can be made.
Price D, the parent's (or majority's) maximum, is the price that would be
paid based on the parent's peculiar view of the subsidiary's prospects. In any
situation in which a deal could be made, price D is by definition higher than
price C since, unless there is some profit in the deal, the parent would not be
interested. It may be that the parent thinks a lower interest rate is applicable
in capitalizing returns than do the minority shareholders or that the parent
knows that the subsidiary may be made more efficient. As Weinberger itself
demonstrates the latter probably cannot be acted upon legally unless the
knowledge comes exclusively from the parent's information about its own op-
portunities or the existence of public shareholders is somehow inconsistent
with the plans.117
Price D', the parent's perceived value is calculated using the same factors
as one would use to calculate Price D. 68 Price D' would never willingly be
paid since it would eliminate all profit from the transaction. However, price D'
could be the measure of rescissory damages in an appropriate case. Though
the Delaware court has not focused on the distinction between these two
prices, both are implicated in the Weinberger decision. Price E, other ac-
quirer's maximum, is the price which someone other than the parent (applying
a still lower interest rate or having still better plans for the subsidiary) would
166. The market price, if any, of the majority's shares (which is to say the price
at which a controlling block of shares could be sold) is not a good indicator either since
it may be inflated by the same recognitions that depress price A. See Perlman v. Feld-
mann, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
167. 457 A.2d at 715.
168. The difference is that a lower rate of interest equal to the company's cost of
capital is used to calculate this value. Typically, a company will establish a minimum
percentage return in excess of its cost of capital to use as a "filter" to determine
whether a particular project should be considered. See P. HUNT, C. WILLIAMS & G.
DONALDSON, BASic BUSINESS FINANCE: A TEXT 183-99 (4th ed. 1971); note 144 supra.
Thus a company with an average cost of capital of 10% might only consider invest-
ments returning 12% or even 15% (indeed the facts of Weinberger suggest that the
parent there was looking for a 15.5% return as a minimum, 457 A.2d at 709.). Once
the project is undertaken, though, the returns will be valued by investors according to
the interest rate they demand, that is, the cost of capital, assuming that the project is
not so risky as to increase the cost of capital beyond the projected return. It could be
argued that the parent, in fairness to the minority, should not analyze the freeze-out
decision as it does other investment decisions, since it takes no additional risk. By this
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be willing to pay. 6 9
Each of the prices other than price C may be found with a fair degree of
accuracy. Price C, however, is not a unique value. It ranges all the way from
the most pessimistic (price B) to the most optimistic (price D). If it is neces-
sary to choose a single value as in an appraisal proceeding, it would seem most
reasonable to choose some sort of average, either the median of all values or a
weighted average. The median value (which is often but not always equal to
the weighted average'70 ) is the price which would induce half of the sharehold-
ers to tender.17 ' In the case of an independent company with widely scattered
shareholdings, it is the price for which control could be purchased . 2 Thus,
this method of establishing a value for price C has the advantage of comport-
ing with reality, and explains why premiums are paid in tender offers and
freeze-outs.
169. Of course, there is not always a price E to the right of D or D'. If the parent
is doing an adequate management job, the additional risk that an outsider would face
(which the parent has already mastered) would in most cases force the outsider to
insist on a higher rate of return than the parent. See J. WESTON & E. BRIGHAM, supra
note 71, at 362-63. Moreover, assuming the parent is acting rationally, it would sell the
subsidiary to any such bidder. All this suggests that third-party sale value, which has
been receiving considerable attention recently, see, e.g. Chazen, supra note 46, will
only very rarely be relevant to fair price. A recent counter-example, however, was the
going private offer by Norton-Simon which caused an active search for outside bidders,
perhaps intentionally. Wall Street Journal, June 8, 1983, at 4, col. 2. One must be
careful, however, in comparing sales of control with freeze-outs since in the former
price is set by those who value their stock most highly, while in the latter price is set by
those who place the lowest values on their stock. So viewed it is not surprising that an
outside bidder might be willing to top the bid of an insider.
170. See note 175, infra.
171. In practice the price set by a tender offer could be depressed by various
coercive elements. See, e.g., Kaufmann v. Lawrence, 386 F. Supp. 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
affd, 514 F.2d 283 (2nd Cir. 1975). The price could also be inflated by the sharehold-
ers' perception that the acquirer would better manage the company, would make more
profits than current management and thus would be willing to pay more. For the pre-
sent purposes of deriving price C or investment value (since the goal is to construct a
model of fair negotiating), these distorting factors should be eliminated. The inflating
factors are not necessarily an issue in the context of a freeze-out since it is current
management that is the purchaser. One may think of price C or investment value as
the price which was sought in an appraisal proceeding before Weinberger. It is impor-
tant to remember, though, that now a different price will be sought. Assuming that
Weinberger does require that the appraiser seek to replicate the results of fair bargain-
ing, pre-merger investment value is a lower limit for negotiators for which they would
never settle (except in the case of an arm's length acquisition if the negotiator believed
that the acquiring company was going to lose money).
172. See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND
MATERIALS: TEACHER'S MANUAL 108-10 (1972).
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(Note: Prices B and D' are indicated for clarification. It could be argued that
the points indicated should be prices A and D though that would be less con-
sistent with the goal of compensating shareholders for the fair value of what
they gave up.)
This tender offer model of investment value is itself best understood
graphically. In Figure 2-1, the shareholder valuation line (SI') is determined
by the premium that must be offered to induce a particular percentage of
shareholders to tender. Assuming that the line is a straight one, the price at
which one-half will tender (C) when multiplied by the total quantity of shares
(that is, 100%) produces a rectangle which is equal in area to the large trian-
gle. The rectangle thus represents the total dollar premium that would be paid
in a two step acquisition in which the initial tender offer brings in just enough
shares to achieve control and the second step freeze-out merger is carried out
at the same price173 Half the shareholders are under-compensated and half
are over-compensated, but the total premium paid would be sufficient, if it
could be distributed unequally, to satisfy all the shareholders. 7 4 If the merger
173. Neither Singer nor Weinberger fits this pattern precisely. In Singer, the
tender offer price was enough to attract 84% of the shares and the soon to follow
merger was at the same price. In Weinberger, the tender offer for 50.5% was greatly
oversubscribed and the merger was at the same price, but it happened three years later
when the value of the subsidiary could have changed substantially. Indeed, the market
price of the subsidiary's stock was up somewhat and presumably should have been up
somewhat more if not for its captive position.
174. Of course in a merger the cash cannot be distributed unequally (except to
1984]
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were challenged it would arguably be unfair to the acquiring company to re-
quire it to pay any more to any shareholder, since it has already paid full
value. 17
5
All this argues strongly that the median price is fair. However, the me-
dian depends on the segment of the shareholder population to which an offer is
being made. In the case of a freeze-out it is fair to presume that those who
control the company value it most highly. The controlling shareholders are
privileged to establish dividend and investment policies within a broad range to
serve their personal interests: that is, they can tailor the mix between current
the extent dissenters convince a court that they deserve more). Some view equal treat-
ment as a central tenet of corporation law. See, e.g., Brudney, A Note on Going Pri-
vate, 61 VA. L. REV. 1028-29 (1975). And indeed in many familiar contexts, for exam-
ple, dividends, voting and tender offers, equal treatment is required. But see Ratner,
The Government of Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One
Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1970) (arguments for not allocating share-
holder votes according to share ownership). However, unequal treatmen( is legally con-
doned both in a company's open-market repurchases of its own stock and, possibly, in a
controlling shareholder's sale of his shares at a premium. Despite the requirement of
equal treatment of shareholders, it is widely accepted that a company may repurchase
its own shares on the market for the express purpose of eliminating those shareholders
who value the company least and of raising the price available to those who do not sell.
See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 152, at 481-82; Nathan & Sobel,
Corporate Stock Repurchases in the Context of Unsolicited Takeover Bids, 35 Bus.
LAW. 1545 (1980). By the same token, it could be argued that controlling shareholders
are entitled to sell their shares for investment value plus that portion of the triangle
above (see Figure 2-1) attributable to them. Such a result would be unequal but fair,
assuming full disclosure. However it appears that none of the cases in which premiums
have been given up have recognized this potentially justifiable (fair) element of unequal
treatment. See, e.g., Perlman v. Feldmann 154 F.Supp. 435 (D. Conn. 1957).
In addition, it is increasingly common in hostile take-overs for an acquirer to em-
ploy two-tier pricing, offering a higher price in a tender offer and a lower one in a
subsequent merger. See Mirvis, supra note 93, at 485. The practice has obvious poten-
tial for unfairness (particularly since shareholders who receive the lower price were
reluctant to tender at the higher one) and has been roundly criticized. Brudney &
Chirelstein, Fair Shares, supra note 20, at 336-40. Moreover, if the plan for a lower
merger price is known in advance, it will coerce some to tender who would not other-
wise, thus distorting the median as a measure of fairness. Thus, even when sharehold-
ers are treated equally, (e.g., by having a pro rata portion of their shares purchased at
the higher price) the price may well be too low.
175. If the line is not straight, this is not true. If the line curves upward as line
SV' in Figure 2-3, the total premium could be less than enough to satisfy all sharehold-
ers, i.e., the area of the rectangle is less than the area under the curved line (such a
line might well obtain in a long depressed market). By the same token, if the line
curves downward, the acquirer could pay more than investment value. The upward
curving line depicted in the figure offers a possible explanation and justification for
management resistance to hostile tender offers.
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and future income.'Y6 They are also in a position to avoid the risks they think
most dangerous. In short, they can maximize their own value and would there-












176. See note 157, supra.
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owns half the shares. The premium necessary to induce the last 50% to tender
is ignored since to include it would require the parent to pay a price based in
part on buying its own shares.17 The median price demanded by the minority
shareholders (C) is full compensation (that is, the area of the small rectangle
equals the area of the small triangle) even though it is only half the price that
would be fair if the company were being bought in an arm's length deal.17 8
In an arm's length bargaining situation the parent and the subsidiary (or
minority) could reach agreement on any price falling between C and D. The
precise point is a matter of the parties' relative bargaining power. Depending
on the circumstances it might be that no agreement would be reached because
of the subsidiary's knowledge (or suspicion) that others would be willing to
pay more, for example price E, or indeed the parent's inability or unwilling-
ness even to pay price C.
The question, however, is how does a court settle on any particular price
in the negotiating range. Clearly to fall back to approving the price proposed
by the parent unless it is demonstrably unfair is simply to affirm the parent's
ability to set the lowest defensible fair price. That is not "entire fairness" by
any standard and is certainly not what the Weinberger court had in mind.
Professors Brudney and Chirelstein have suggested that since the subsidi-
ary is captive and no real bargaining can exist, the fair solution is to divide the
"synergistic" gains from the merger in proportion to the values of the par-
ties.178 Thus, if the subsidiary were worth $5 million and the parent worth
$100 million and the combined firm predicted to be worth $115 million (for
whatever reason), the subsidiary's shareholders should get 5/105 of the $10
million gain. In other words, the fairest price would be a point 5/105 of the
way from C to D on the graph. 80
This method has several shortcomings. First, it is unclear that a bargain-
ing situation cannot be approximated. Even if it cannot it may be clear in
177. The reference here is to price D, the value to the parent, which is to say the
price the parent would demand from an outside purchaser of its stock and not to price
D which is an internally set maximum used to determine whether an investment is a
wise one. This suggests that premiums offered in successful freeze-outs would, on the
average, be lower than those offered for control by an outside purchaser. Existing data
are inconclusive and indeed confusing.
178. See R. POSNER & K. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SE-
CURITIES REGULATION 222-31 (1980); Chazen, supra note 46, at 1447-49; DeAngelo,
DeAngelo & Rice, supra note 84. Even if the data agreed to some extent, it would be
difficult to eliminate the effects of various regulations on the premiums offered (for
example, the Williams Act, state takeover statutes or the business purpose doctrine).
See Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, The Market for Corporate Control, and
the Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1978).
179. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares, supra note 20, at 313-25.
180. As presented, the formula was applied to market prices rather than "invest-
ment values" as developed here. Id. at 310-15. However, it does appear that Professors
Brudney and Chirelstein intended the size of the gain to be based on the parent's cost
of capital rather than a higher internally set rate inasmuch as they measure the gain by
the full increase in market value. Id.
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some cases that the minority would be in a better or worse negotiating posi-
tion. For example, a smallish subsidiary might command something more than
a proportionate amount because of numerous potential competing bidders. On
the other hand, a company acquired at arm's length may bring little more
than investment value if the target's negotiators either do not know the bid-
der's plans or do not expect the bidder to make significant changes. In short,
even if synergistic gains are the only justification for freeze-out mergers, there
may be good reasons why a parent negotiating at arm's length with its subsidi-
ary would pay more or less than the proportionate share.
Second, and more important, in the context of a freeze-out effected after
a long-standing parent-subsidiary relationship (which is the only situation in
which the formula was proposed to be used),181 it seems likely that any possi-
ble synergistic gains have already been achieved and would be reflected in the
price of the subsidiary's stock. 1 2 Assuming that investment value already in-
cludes a proportionate share of achieved synergy gains, why should a parent be
required to pay more than investment value at the time of a delayed freeze-
out? If the merger is undertaken for other valid reasons-legitimate selfish
reasons as contemplated under the competing interests approach to fiduciary
duty 8 3 --it is not clear that gains must be shared. The rationale that synergis-
181. Professors Brudney and Chirelstein distinguish three types of freeze-out
mergers. The freeze-out that is planned from the beginning as a second step in an
arm's length acquisition (an "integrated two-step merger"), such as that in Singer,
requires little regulation, they argue, because the acquirer owes no duty to the target.
See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1359-65. For that reason,
and others, they argue in A Restatement that Singer was mistaken law. The freeze-out
which is not planned from the time control is obtained (such as that in Weinberger)
does require scrutiny because of the parent's fiduciary duty to the subsidiary and the
potential for overreaching. Id. at 1370-76. Finally, they argue that the pure "going
private" transaction (the freeze-out in which the parent is a mere shell formed for the
purpose) should be banned because it has too little economic justification. Id. at 1365-
70.
182. Professors Brudney and Chirelstein apparently assumed that synergistic
gains were the primary and perhaps exclusive permissible motivation for interested
mergers. Apparently they had in mind such effects as efficiencies of scale, reduction of
risk through diversification and even increased sales or lowered expenses resulting from
combined organizations. Along with such motivations should probably be included mo-
nopoly profits which, though objectionable, are no doubt often actively pursued. But,
with the exception of the administrative costs attendant to maintaining two corpora-
tions (which are negligible), there is no apparent reason why most of these gains cannot
be achieved and, in most cases are achieved, within a parent-subsidiary relationship.
Thus, there seems to be little reason to distinguish between the freeze-out mergers
between parent and subsidiary, both of which operate going businesses, and the pure
going private transaction which does nothing but eliminate the public shareholders. See
Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1370-72.
183. In support of their proposed formula, Professors Brudney and Chirelstein
struck an analogy with a trustee who manages two separate accounts with similar
objectives. Returns would in such a situation be apportioned so as to give each an equal
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tic gains arise from value that is inherent in the subsidiary simply does not
apply.1 8
4
While synergistic gains are presumably allocable to both parties, it is
clear that there are nonsynergistic gains to which the minority is not entitled.
Indeed, such gains may be much more common than synergistic gains. They
include those gains arising from discrepant perceptions of risk or return, dif-
fering costs of funds and opportunities belonging to the parent-majority.
Gains such as these are more akin to the sort of gains an independent
acquirer perceives, and it would seem that in the absence of a good reason to
preclude these wealth-increasing transactions, a parent should be as free to
pursue them as an unrelated party.185 Indeed, the parent may legitimately per-
ceive such opportunities much sooner than outsiders and hence will increase
wealth earlier.
The law does not require a parent to share its separate wealth to keep the
minority happy. Indeed, the law protects the parent's right to determine in-
vestment and dividend policy within broad limits. In sum, there is no apparent
reason that, simply because a subsidiary has been a captive for years, it some-
how becomes entitled to opportunities presented to the parent-even those that
the parent may have had at the time of acquisition-and every reason to be-
lieve the parent should be free to pursue its own interest. On the other hand,
even though such gains need not be shared with the subsidiary they would
figure in any negotiations and ultimately raise the price to the majority by
some indeterminate amount.
The formula proposed in Fair Shares could be used to determine, arbi-
trarily, the outcome of such negotiations, but it is not clearly so difficult to
assess the bargaining positions of the two parties that an inflexible rule is re-
quired. Moreover there will be situations in which using the formula will pre-
clude a deal that otherwise would be made. 86 The law should thus allow for
There is, however, an important difference between trustees and corporate manag-
ers: a trustee is strictly forbidden from profiting from his position, a corporate manager
is not. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
999 (1981). Ironically, if the analogy were correct the parent would have a considera-
bly stronger motivation to get rid of the minority.
184. Cf. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares, supra note 20, at 307-16, 325-30.
185. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 160.
186. See Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares, supra note 20, at 313-25. Note
that under the Fair Shares formula the parent is still generously treated: it gets both
its proportionate share of the gain and part of the subsidiary's share (equal to its per-
centage ownership). Thus, in a drastic case in which the parent and subsidiary are the
same size and the parent owns a bare controlling interest, the parent gets 31 of the gain
even under the formula. Nonetheless the 1/4 that goes to the minority may make a
difference. If it does, the parent probably faces limited investment opportunities and
would probably be doing the minority a considerable favor by effecting a freeze-out,
even at investment value. See note 157, supra. On the other hand, why should the
parent, no matter what its condition, forego any profit it can in fairness make? The
parent already owns its shares. The monetary issue to be addressed is how is the gain
attributable to the minority stake to be divided.
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remedies based on a broad range of factors including synergistic gains, if any.
Weinberger appears to do precisely that. By allowing the courts to take cogni-
zance of any generally accepted method of valuation Weinberger provides a
means for calculating the range within which the parties would have negoti-
ated. Reference to premiums in comparable transactions and post-merger
gains should allow the courts to approximate the point within the range on
which the parties would likely settle.
C. Appraisal in the Fairly Approved Merger
While rescissory damages are presumably available only when a merger
has been coerced, reference to cash flow, premiums and post-merger gains can
produce comparable results whether or not there is coercion. The flexibility
inherent in the Weinberger approach thus will make it that much easier for
dissenters to make out credible cases for additional compensation even in
fairly approved mergers. It seems likely that cases will arise in which a dis-
senter will be able to prove that the acquisition was more valuable than the
majority of the minority thought even though they were fully informed. One
might expect such a result fully half the time. Indeed, the tender offer model
assumes that half the minority values the stock at a price in excess of the
minimum, that is, investment value. The question is whether that means that a
dissenter will be able to obtain additional compensation even in a fairly ap-
proved merger.
Moreover, since the price that the parent is willing to pay for a subsidi-
ary's cash flow ultimately depends on the parent's cost of capital, another par-
ent with a lower cost of capital might be willing to pay more.18 7 Since the
court expressly approved evidence of premiums paid in comparable transac-
tions, the question arises whether the range of acceptable prices should be
regarded as the parent's range or a broader one (that is, segment CD or seg-
ment CE on Figure 1). If the latter, there may even be instances in which
additional compensation is assessed against a parent in such amount as to
render the transaction uneconomic. Whatever sort of relief may now be appro-
priate against a parent who coerces a freeze-out, it is difficult to believe that
the Weinberger court intended such a drastic fate to befall the parent who
fairly obtains the minority's blessing. Such a result would be inconsistent with
the notion of negotiation that is implicit in the Weinberger decision.
Finally, if appraisal now allows for a bonus payment to dissenters even in
fairly approved mergers, at least some shareholders will be inclined to vote
"no" even if they think the price is fair, since by voting "no" they may be able
187. This may well be a rare situation since an outsider would likely insist on a
higher return because of the greater risk it perceives as an unknowledgeable outsider.
See note 169, supra. On the other hand, a court might choose to ignore this impedi-
ment on the theory that the minority should not be penalized because of the identity of
its parent. The question, again, is should one focus on the gain to the parent or the loss
to the minority. See notes 130, 141, supra.
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to exact a higher price, through appraisal without much risk of being awarded
a lower one.188 Such a result would be utterly inconsistent with Weinberger's
stress on shareholder voting. Moreover, management, in order to assure that
the transaction would be approved by ever more sophisticated shareholders
and to assure that the number of appraisal seekers would be minimized, would
likely increase the premium offered over the average market premium. Thus,
the average itself would creep upward. Since there is no effective ceiling on the
premium short of the maximum price consistent with a good investment for
the parent, 189 it is likely that soon parents would be offering nearly that price.
It is extremely unlikely that the Weinberger court intended minorities eventu-
ally to inherit the greater part of the benefits of freeze-outs. 90 That would
effectively ban them even though the court apparently made freeze-outs easier
188. The risk is that enough shareholders would vote "no" to stop a transaction
that they actually would have considered desirable. Hence, after a close loss, it would
not be irrational for the parent to hold a second vote on the same terms. The appraisal
statute discourages such behavior to some extent since it requres a shareholder to in-
form the corporation in advance of his intent to seek appraisal. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 262(d) (1983). If shareholders become adept at this, the notification process would,
practically speaking, become the vote itself. Of course, any shareholder who seeks ap-
praisal must be willing to wait for his money. Delaware courts, however, take a flexible
approach to awarding interest after appraisal and the loss, particularly now in light of
Weinberger, may be minimal. See Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp. 429 A.2d 497, 506
(Del. 1981) (Lynch 11).
189. See note 168, supra.
190. See note 186, supra. One could argue that there is nothing wrong with al-
lowing minorities to exact as much of the profit as they can as long as the transaction
still occurs. Distribution of the profit is a matter of indifference, the argument would
continue, and therefore policies like allowing an appraisal bonus may be adopted if
they are desirable for other reasons. One would conclude, then, that there is nothing
inconsistent between an appraisal bonus and the Weinberger regime. However, it is
vital to insure that the majority is not disfavored. Two themes that pervade the eco-
nomically oriented writing on corporations are (1) that transactions are motivated by
the mutual desires of the parties to maximize their individual wealth and (2) that in a
free market, like the stock market, such transactions lead to a state of equilibrium in
which it is impossible to make a profit. Note that while the two themes are closely
connected, they are also in conflict. If profit making were impossible because of effi-
cient pricing then transactions would never occur. See J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE
STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 98 (1973); Fischel, Use of Modern Finance
Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus. LAW.
1, 14 (1982).
This is not the place to pursue cosmic details, but it seems reasonable that in this
system of thinking about economic behavior, one must leave room for a prime mover of
sorts, one who determines to apply physical assets to a project hitherto not divulged to
the market and therefore not reflected in the price he pays for it. Otherwise, activity
would cease. Since only majorities are in a position to do such things (only one "per-
son" can be), it is crucial that they be left some margin-both of profit and for error.
Minorities are, after all, passive investors and rarely, if ever, are they in a position to
initiate any innovative action. To allow the possibility-in a fairly negotiated transac-
tion-of minorities gaining a very large proportion of the benefits would not put an end
to freeze-outs but it would tip the balance in the wrong direction.
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to accomplish legally by its increased reliance on voting and elimination of the
business purpose test. It is still less likely that the court intended for targets in
arm's length mergers to enjoy such a windfall.191 It must be concluded, there-
fore, that the court did not intend the possibility of gain through appraisal in a
fairly approved transaction.1 92 At the very least, it is clear that, if Weinberger
is interpreted to mean that additional compensation may be available to dis-
senters even in fairly approved mergers, it will ultimately discourage freeze-
outs even though a safe-harbor procedure has been devised and the business
purpose test has been eliminated.193
191. See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1359-62.
192. Bizarre issues would no doubt creep up in those few mergers that were still
effected despite such an interpretation of Weinberger. Shareholders of parents might be
induced to bring law suits alleging that they had been unfairly treated by a minority
which managed to exact too high a price. And minority shareholders who were not
frozen-out might begin to demand to be when premiums had been bid up. They could
argue that, but for the subsidiary's captive position, it could have been sold to a parent
who would pay more than current investment value and that, therefore, the current
parent had breached its fiduciary duty by keeping for itself a subsidiary that would
have been more valuable in another parent's hands. This could create problems for a
majority that does not have the cash or credit necessary and might even lead to serious
consideration whether a parent company has a duty to sell a subsidiary to another
parent who may be in the position to pay the going premium. One could of course
make that sort of argument under the current state of the law anyway.
It has been observed that perhaps the worst fate that can befall a shareholder is to
be "frozen-in" to an investment in a depressed subsidiary. See Borden, supra note 3, at
1003; see also Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1369. It has
become fairly common for individual shareholders to demand that an issuer repurchase
their shares at a premium. The practice, called "greenmail" by some, was recently
reviewed by the SEC's advisory committee on tender offer rules which recommended
that issuer repurchases in excess of 15% be approved by stockholder vote. See Excerpts
from Final Report of SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, [July-Dec.] SEC
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 28, at 1375, 1380 (July 15, 1983); see also Tobin &
Maiwurm, Beachhead Acquisitions: Creating Waves in the Marketplace and Uncer-
tainty in the Regulatory Framework, 38 Bus. LAW. 419, 440-45 (1983). See generally
Israels, Limitations on the Corporate Purchase of Its Own Shares 22 Sw. L.J. 755
(1968); Nathan & Sobel, supra note 174. On reflection, it is somewhat surprising that
whole groups of shareholders have not joined in such demands, particularly when a
large individual shareholder threatens to coerce favored treatment for himself.
Of course, everyone cannot expect to have his subsidiary owned by the single most
efficient parent and to make the highest return available anywhere in the market
merely because one set of managers has shown it can be done. To impose such a duty
on corporate managers would seemingly run counter to the business judgment rule,
practically speaking, in that it would amount to a duty to succeed rather than a duty to
give one's best efforts. However, if the great majority of parents operate at or close to
the risk-efficient frontier, as has been suggested, that defense is considerably weakened.
See note 160, supra. In any event, one could not make out a case unless a bid had
actually been made for a subsidiary by another parent (though such bids might be
encouraged under the new regime), and it would be extremely difficult to disprove any
reasons that the existing parent might give for not accepting such a bid. Cf. Brudney &
Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1371.
193. Of course, only if the market is perceived as rising, on balance, would it be
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This scenario might be regarded as somewhat fancifull but for the fact
that the Weinberger court, in addition to liberalizing the kind of evidence that
can be introduced in an appraisal proceeding, also held that the appraisal stat-
ute's exclusion of post-merger gains was to be limited to speculative and pro
forma results of the combination. This appears to mean that any foreseeable
gains in cash flow which result from efficiency or synergy from the merger are
compensible to dissenters.
It could be argued that the Weinberger court has contravened the express
terms of the appraisal statute in this aspect of the holding. The statute clearly
says that dissenters are entitled only to pre-merger value.19 4 It could also be
questioned whether the simple addition of the word "fair" to the appraisal
statute could possibly have been intended to add whole new categories of value
to appraisal awards. 195 Yet it seems unrealistic ever to have held that all gains
were post-merger gains. 19 Clearly part of the value of the company being
acquired is its value to potential acquirers.197 Again, often a shareholder buys
at least in part because he thinks some sort of offer might be made for the
company. In short, even given the current language of the appraisal statute, it
appears wrong for all of the gain to go to either side, but the proportion in
which it should be shared is a matter peculiar to each case.
Nevertheless, the essence of the court's holding is unmistakeable. As such
it necessitates a rule against appraisal bonuses in fairly approved mergers
since it is easy to imagine that, unchecked, the new appraisal could turn some
profitable mergers into money losers. For example, suppose a cash-poor parent
with a barely controlling interest and an especially good idea developed within
its own planning department proposed a freeze-out, at a price based on the
subsidiary's prospects in the subsidiary's current business without the benefit
of the innovation. Suppose further that during the course of an appraisal it
becomes clear that the new strategy promises to be quite successful though it
has not yet started generating much cash. The dissenting shareholders are
awarded their proportionate share of provable post-merger gains, in this case
fully half of the gain, but the parent, struggling perhaps to pay off the freeze-
out as well as to fund the innovative business, still does not have that much
free cash.
necessary continually to increase premiums. In a falling market, premiums would pre-
sumably begin to fall also, though they would remain higher than otherwise. It is easy
to see how an appraisal bonus affects the cost of a freeze-out merger, but even appar-
ently non-monetary impediments, like the business purpose rule, raise the price.
Though this effect has not been demonstrated in connection with the business purpose
doctrine itself, it has been suggested that, in tender offers, defensive maneuvers and
take-over laws may account for greater premiums than would otherwise obtain. See
generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 160; Fischel, supra note 178.
194. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1983).
195. 457 A.2d at 713-14.
196. See, e.g., Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch.
1979).
197. Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares, supra note 20, at 306.
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There are only two alternatives. The parent corporation itself could seek
to undo the transaction, or it could sell the now wholly-owned subsidiary to
someone else, hopefully getting something approaching the value it perceived.
But if the parent succeeded at the former the subsidiary's minority sharehold-
ers would have a strong argument for sale to an alternative parent company;
the existing parent would in essence have admitted its inability to match the
price a cash rich company would have paid.198
Clearly it is absurd to think that the court meant for dissenters to be
awarded 100% of post-merger gains. Such a rule would even more strongly
incline everyone to vote "no" than the mere chance at an appraisal bonus on
pre-merger values as calculated with reference to cash flow and premiums.
Moreover, such a rule would amount to an effective ban on mergers since
there would be insufficient gain left for the acquirer. Indeed, the effect of
awarding post merger gains after the fact and in the absence of coercion, is
worse than precluding a merger altogether by forcing up premiums, since it
operates unpredictably and therefore discourages more mergers than would
actually be affected after the appraisal process was finished. It seems much
more likely that the court had in mind a sharing of post-merger gains and was
indicating, again, that appraisers should look for assurances that the propor-
tions of sharing were reached through fair means. After all, in negotiation,
only a portion of post-merger gain could be commanded by the minority, but
clearly even the weakest negotiator could command some of it.
It is possible that the court decided to allow compensation for post-merger
gains in order to provide some realistic prospect of relief in cases in which the
range of possible prices (measured in advance of the transaction as in the ex-
ample) is narrower than usual. In other words, in some cases post-merger
gains would provide a source of additional awards to minority shareholders
when necessary to punish coercion by the majority.
Still, it seems more likely that the court was simply giving a further ex-
ample of the new approach to appraisal. In a true negotiation, the target com-
198. This scenario is not at all far-fetched. In Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp.,
429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981) (Lynch II), the Delaware Supreme Court reinstated a claim
for rescissory damages based upon a parent's failure to disclose in a tender offer that it
was willing to pay more in open market purchases. The court instructed that on re-
mand the amount awarded should reflect the value of the stock at the time of trial, four
years after the tender offer. The tender offer had drawn in more than 72% of the 46.5%
minority shares at $12 per share. The supreme court instructed, however, that on re-
mand the range of $15 to $41.40 should be considered, the former being the price the
parent was willing to pay and the latter being the price argued for by the plaintiffs
which included post-merger gains.
Consider the parent's options if the maximum price were awarded and for some
reason it could not pay. To undo the transaction would mean forcing the long-gone
minority to take back their shares. It is unlikely that any court would ever order that
and few shareholders would voluntarily accept such shares if by refusing they would
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pany would not settle for investment value. Knowing that the merger would
not be proposed unless the acquirer expected to make money, the target could
command some of the gain up front.199 Looking at premiums in comparable
transactions provides one kind of evidence of where the parties would agree.
However, the premiums in comparable transactions emanate from the same
source, the expectation of gain after the merger. Looking directly to post-
merger gains then is simply a more specific inquiry of the same sort. It is no
reason to believe that the court intended for appraisers to rework mergers ex-
hibiting fair dealing, that is, the attributes of arm's length negotiating."'
These speculations may be quite disturbing to a parent that is found to
have coerced a minority vote. When a vote is fairly solicited, however, there
are good reasons to believe that appraisals should not diverge significantly, if
at all, from the price approved by the minority vote. Nevertheless, aside from
the court's virtual insistence that appraisal and fairness results now be identi-
cal and the wisdom of a policy against any divergence, the impression lingers
that, in the court's finally accepting real evidence of value, a shareholder may
do better than ever before in appraisal. It is dissenters, after all, who under-
take appraisal and presumably would prefer to remain investors even under
new management. Moreover, the dissenter is entitled to an appraisal whether
or not there is actionable unfairness.
It is at least arguable that the appraisal price may justifiably differ from
the fairness trial price. It has in the past. A fairness hearing may be aimed
only at determining the price at which the transaction would occur under
arm's length bargaining. With the new evidence allowable, one might well ar-
gue that the courts have finally recognized that the dissenter is at least entitled
to the monetary equivalent of keeping his stock, that is the value of the subsid-
iary to the parent (price D' on Figure 1). The facts in Weinberger itself sug-
gest this result.
Consider a perfectly fair arm's length merger. Some shareholders will
199. In terms of Figure 2-1, text supra at notes 173-75, shareholders' beliefs that
the acquirer would reap gains from changes in the business would have the effect of
moving the entire shareholder value line vertically, unless, of course, the value line
already reflects information of that sort as the efficient market hypothesis suggests it
would. In short, post-merger gains add nothing to the calculation which is not reflected
in the other two factors unless the parent has managed to keep something secret and
perhaps only if the secret is a significant innovation or discovery. See, e.g., Lynch v.
Vickers Energy Co., 429 A.2d 497 (Del. 1981) (Lynch II) (discovery of North Sea oil).
But it is precisely in such circumstances one must be most careful not to disfavor the
parent. To the extent that Weinberger limits additional compensation to situations in
which coercion is shown it will not discourage economic growth.
200. Admittedly, a minority which is in the unfortunate position of having the
subsidiary controlled by a relatively inefficient parent will probably settle for less than
it would if the subsidiary were an independent company. It is in this situation alone
(which is in many ways parallel to an innocently conceived tender offer-such as that
in Lynch-that works out too well for the parent) that one may want to reserve some
power to grant additional compensation. However, in such a case it is quite likely that
a fairly credible case of nondisclosure could be developed.
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think their stock is worth more than the price paid. Appraisal entitles them to
the stock's value, not the value at which they would deal (which may be un-
realistically high), and not the market price or the intrinsic or investment
value. Rather, if the argument is correct, the dissenter is presumably now enti-
tled to the value of the stock to the acquiring corporation, less whatever
merger gains continue to be excludable. If the dissenters are correct, why
should they be done out of their investment by the ignorant majority of the
minority? While one may argue that in the case of an arm's length one-step or
integrated two-step merger, the coercion of majority rule may be justified as
necessary to accomplishing any deal at all, in the case of a freeze-out merger,
it is not, since the majority is already in control and will probably go ahead
with its plans anyway.201
While these arguments have some merit they should not prevail. In the
first place, the dissenter is in effect asking for rescissory damages when he
demands full post-merger gains. Weinberger clearly holds that rescissory dam-
ages are awardable only when there has been coercion.
Secondly, the essence of the dissenter's argument is that he should not be
required to give up his stock over his objection, since he is entitled to every bit
of measurable benefit attached to it. But this argument ignores the fact that
the dissenter is being forced to yield only in order to achieve a much larger,
mutually beneficial transaction. No one seems to question the propriety of
forcing the dissenter to sell in an arm's length transaction when the bidder
insists on 100% ownership. Majority rule in such a case, while mildly coer-
cive,202 is necessary to overcome the impossibility of negotiating with hundreds
of individuals. But there is really no more justification for a freeze-out in con-
nection with an arm's length merger than there is for the pure going private
transaction. 203 The potential detriment of having a minority is the same for an
arm's length acquirer as for one who is already a parent.
There is no reason why the parent should be denied the ability, with ap-
propriate safeguards, to pursue the same opportunities available to an indepen-
dent acquirer. Indeed, perhaps the parent should have somewhat more free-
dom to do so since it may already have suffered damage from the existence of
the minority.
Finally, the value the parent places on the subsidiary could never be
achieved in arm's length bargaining. 20 4 There must be some differential re-
maining to motivate the transaction from the acquirer's point of view. Thus,
assuming one agrees that freeze-outs are justifiable, the most anyone could
ever realize is the amount the parent is willing to pay rather than value to the
201. In addition, one could argue that the minority shareholder should be re-
warded for having held on to his shares in a captive company, with its depressed value,
since if things had not worked out well for the parent, the minority shareholder likely
would have been stuck forever.
202. See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1359-61.
203. See note 181, supra.
204. See text at notes 148-49, supra.
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parent. 20 5
Inevitably, however, one must grapple again with the possibility that an-
other bidder might be willing to pay more.206 Still, in any negotiation there
comes a time to stop talking and make a deal. Though it is always possible
that a better deal will be made, at some point the cost of making it exceeds
the additional gain. The benefits of facilitating the consummation of mergers
beneficial to both parties would seem in the end far to exceed the cost of an
occasional instance in which a subsidiary could have been sold as a whole to
another parent.
If one accepts the thesis that Delaware has substituted a negotiation
model for a rigid rule or formula, it would seem likely that the narrow excep-
tions for speculative gain will ultimately come to refer to that segment of the
range of values lying between the investment value price C plus an appropriate
but indeterminate premium and the acquirer's maximum price. In one sense
that is precisely what speculative means: that portion of value perceived by the
buyer but not perceived by the seller. The appraisal statute still says that the
dissenter is entitled to pre-merger value.20 7 Much as one might believe that
appraisal should afford full value, the statute does not allow it. The dissenter
still loses something.
There is a sense in which it is unfair to the majority to say that full value
should be available to the minority. There will always be something between
the fair dealing price and the maximum. If appraisal were to be interpreted to
entitle the minority to the maximum, it would be senseless for anyone ever to
vote in favor of a merger. One would vote "no" to protect one's individual
appraisal rights in hopes that others would vote yes and take the cash.
Whether one thinks the court intended to substitute a negotiating model or
not, surely it did not intend to inject that sort of artificial incentive into the
voting process the process which, after all, is essential to eliminating coercion
in freeze-outs. 0
Here then is the strongest argument of all that Weinberger should not be
interpreted to allow additional compensation to shareholders dissenting from
fairly approved mergers. Since the decision applies to all appraisals, the poten-
tial for additional compensation amounts to something akin to the old common
law right of a shareholder to veto the transaction, or to hold out for more, in a
205. See note 168, supra. Neither is such a bonus necessary in a freeze-out in
order to compensate the minority for waiting for its money since the time control was
acquired by the majority. Under Weinberger, the minority shareholder will be compen-
sated according to the value of the subsidiary in the hands of the parent. That is, the
investment value of the minority's stock should already include any efforts at better
management and "negotiations" will start from there. Thus, there is no sense in which
the minority will have been strung along never to realize any of the greater gains that
supposedly justified the original transaction.
206. See note 147, supra.
207. See notes 197-198, supra.
208. See text at note 103, supra.
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situation that requires some admittedly artificial device to "negotiate" a trans-
action beneficial to both sides. Appraisal rights were, after all, the quid pro
quo for denying hold-up rights to individual shareholders. They recognize the
need to allow for wholesale transfers of assets without the sort of impediments
one finds in partnerships. 209
The upshot of all of this is that Weinberger must be viewed as holding
that, if a freeze-out is coerced, the court, whether in litigation or appraisal,
will be free to set an alternate price for the transaction from within the range
of acceptable prices. It should not be read as otherwise authorizing divergent
prices to be set by appraisal. This suggests that appraisal might become obso-
lete. However, litigation is certainly more time consuming and expensive. Ap-
praisal should thus be retained in the interest of judicial economy, but some
sort of penalty for instituting frivolous proceedings should be added to com-
pensate for the fact that an appraisal proceeding is not subject to summary
dismissal. Perhaps unjustified appraisal proceedings should result in a lesser
valuation for dissenters than the ratified price. Bringing an unjustified ap-
praisal proceeding could be viewed as unfair dealing by a minority justifying
something like rescissory damages being assessed against them.
In summary, Weinberger requires that identical notions of fairness be ap-
plied both in appraisal and in proceedings at equity. If the same standard of
fairness must necessarily apply in both forums then the appraiser must be
without authority to set another price when a court would be powerless to do
so, including situations in which it appears that for some reason (other than
coercion) the minority's approval was irrational.210
IV. THE BROADER IMPLICATIONS OF Weinberger
The minority vote under Weinberger provides substantial assurance
against fairness challenges both in court and by appraisal and thus now as-
sumes real importance. Very few transactions can be expected to be under-
taken without a vote. Note, however, that since proxies must therefore be
solicited, it appears that the Delaware court has insured that a federal cause
of action will exist in virtually every case in which Delaware itself would rec-
ognize a cause of action. 211 Under TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.,21 2 few if
209. It is standard in partnerships for unanimity to be required in any decision
affecting the scope of the partnership business. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(h), 6
U.L.A. 213 (1969). Numerous cases describe the horrors of partners' inability to agree
when such proposals are at issue. See, e.g., Summers v. Dooley, 94 Idaho 87, 481 P.2d
318 (1971).
210. See, e.g., Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F.Supp. 198 (D. Del.
1943), affd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944).
211. Proxy solicitation is, of course, governed by § 14 of the Securities Exchange
Act. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1982). A private right
of action is recognized for violations and, notably, plaintiffs need not prove reliance on
any misrepresentation or omission and may not need to prove anything more than neg-
ligence on the part of the defendant. See Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
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any proxy solicitation cases in which a parent owned a majority of stock would
have presented an issue under federal law since the minority's vote would have
been unnecessary to accomplish the transaction. Now every such vote in con-
nection with freeze-outs of Delaware subsidiaries is certainly an important
though perhaps not "essential" link in the process.
213
Weinberger also casts doubt on the meaning of Santa Fe Industries v.
Green21 4 in which the United States Supreme Court held that a Delaware
freeze-out effected by short-form merger, which required no vote, did not state
a cause of action for fraud under federal law. The Court held that federal law
prohibits deception. Coercion with full disclosure, though it might amount to
the same thing as deception, is not fraud within the meaning of Rule lOb-5. 215
The court further held that the essential issue in Santa Fe, fairness, was a
matter traditionally left to state law.
Now, under Weinberger, the Delaware Supreme Court has not only effec-
tively required a vote and outlawed coercion, it has also transmuted the tradi-
tional standard of fairness into a matter of full disclosure.216 There is, there-
fore, every reason to expect the federal courts to become heavily involved in
freeze-out litigation once again, which means, of course, that the federal
courts will have much to say about the interpretation and application of Wein-
berger, particularly in connection with the standard of materiality to be ap-
plied in assessing the adequacy of disclosure.
What is much less clear is the effect Weinberger will have on other areas
of Delaware corporation law. The court declared that in connection with
freeze-out mergers the business purpose requirement should "no longer be of
any force or effect. ' 21 7 While it is easy enough to limit this pronouncement to
freeze-out mergers, it seems natural to think that the business purpose doc-
(1970); J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,
478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
212. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
213. 426 U.S. at 499. However, in Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,
385 n.7 (1970), the Supreme Court did leave open the possibility of recognizing a
causal connection between the vote and accomplishing the transaction even though the
management controls a sufficient number of shares to insure approval "if the manage-
ment finds it necessary for [other] legal or practical reasons to solicit proxies from
minority shareholders."
214. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
215. 430 U.S. at 476.
216. There had been some effort after Santa Fe to revive a cause of action for
coercion under Rule lOb-5, on a theory that failure to disclose the potential illegality of
a transaction and the availability of relief under state law violates federal law. See
Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977). Weinberger eliminates the need for
that sort of reasoning, at least in Delaware. See also Weiss, supra note 52, at 260-61.
217. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971); Cheff v.
Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer,
230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1968); See also Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). Moreover, Singer had been followed in several other
states, most faithfully in Hawaii.
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trine will be questioned in other areas of its application. Delaware courts have
resorted to a business purpose test or a closely related formulation to deter-
mine the propriety of a corporation's repurchasing its own shares at a pre-
mium from a dissident shareholder, defensive tactics in connection with take-
over attempts, the use of corporate funds to wage proxy battles and the
declaration of dividends allegedly motivated by the majority shareholder's
need for cash. In general, the courts have recognized in these cases that corpo-
rate actions undertaken without a valid business purpose are not protected by
the business judgment rule. In other words, lack of business purpose is grounds
for challenging the exercise of discretion by directors and officers just as is
self-dealing. 218
Weinberger raises the question whether the courts of Delaware will con-
tinue to recognize this basis for challenging corporate action in other contexts.
One could argue that the business purpose test, as finally developed in the
Singer line of cases, differed from the recognized approach. Indeed, the Wein-
berger court suggests this.2 19 In the other applications of the test, it has been
up to plaintiffs to prove a lack of business purpose, a standard so difficult as to
be qualitatively different from that adopted in Singer. However, this mode of
distinguishing Weinberger from other business purpose cases leaves open the
possibility that in some obscure (and presumably drastic) situations the tradi-
tional business purpose exception may indeed apply to freeze-out mergers.
The better view, however, would seem to be that when a transaction in-
volves an alteration in shareholder rights as between the existing majority and
minority, business purpose is an inappropriate standard. That should be obvi-
ous enough anyway; such internal conflict should be resolved with a clear view
that it is just that-internal conflict which stems primarily from competing
personal motivations. Business purpose remains an effective concept in situa-
tions in which the majority uses corporate resources for arguably self-inter-
ested ends without affording the minority an opportunity to cash out.
This distinction may well illustrate a fundamental shift in corporation
law. It encompasses the recognition that shareholders may be more interested
in the potential for liquidating an investment than they are in the ability occa-
sionally to exercise control or simply to feel a proprietary interest in their
shares. This is hardly revolutionary doctrine.220 However, its embodiment in
Weinberger may mean that minority shareholders-indeed all outsider share-
holders-will benefit, not from an increased ability to resist mergers and keep
their investments or gain windfall appraisal awards, but rather from the more
frequent and more predictable use of freeze-outs allowed by the safe-harbor
procedure outlined in Weinberger. It is indeed ironic that such a result should
218. See generally Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 93 (1979).
219. 457 A.2d at 715.
220. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
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come of a campaign that all along appeared to be one to protect the tradi-
tional property rights of the common shareholder.
The ultimate question now is whether minority shareholders can be de-
pended on to take seriously the voting process that is critical to the noncoer-
cive freeze-out. 221 If not, the Weinberger procedure simply gives insiders one
more advantage. One must presume, however, that shareholders will quickly
realize that their vote in connection with a freeze-out should be treated just
like a decision to buy or sell their stock. Indeed, inasmuch as each shareholder
will receive a proxy statement for the vote, it should be more convenient to
make this investment decision intelligently and rationally than it ever is other-
wise. In short, there is really very little reason to worry.
V. CONCLUSION
Professors Brudney and Chirelstein have suggested that Singer was in
part motivated by the late Professor William Cary's criticism that Delaware
corporation law is far too lax.222 While they disagreed with the holding in
Singer they applauded the court's concern and expressed the hope that Singer
would be the law only temporarily until the competing rights of majority and
minority shareholders had been sorted out. Weinberger may well signal that
resolution has been achieved.
Whether Weinberger represents a new trend in Delaware is unclear. On
the one hand, Weinberger may ultimately mean that the courts will scrutinize
disclosure in connection with mergers more closely than ever. One could thus
view the decision as an extension of the Delaware court's new willingness to
substitute its own judgment for that of corporate boards.223 On the other hand,
Weinberger clearly embodies a hands-off attitude, at least when a matter may
be voted on.
As has been argued here, the latter course makes far more sense if one
believes that even mergers negotiated in conflict of interest may be beneficial
to both majority and minority if one realizes that there is no reason to believe
a single fair price exists. Nevertheless, the voting process could serve as easily
as a rationale for the courts to pass on the merits of mergers as it could a
reason not to scrutinize them. That is, the fairness of the vote could become as
221. See generally M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION
(1976); Manning, The Shareholders Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962); Manning, Book Review, 67 YALE L.J. 1477 (1962) (review-
ing J. LININGSTON, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 1958)); Ratner, The Government of
Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote," 56
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1970); Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Re-
form: Berle and Means Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 388 (1977).
222. Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement, supra note 5, at 1354 n.2; see also
Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974).
223. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). See generally
Fisohel, supra note 132.
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much of a morass as did business purpose if the courts are bent on continuing
to review the merits of mergers. However, Weinberger's repeal of the business
purpose test must be viewed as a strong indication of a genuine change in
policy rather than as a mere shift of focus from business purpose to disclosure
as a means of determining fairness. It is therefore crucial to understand the
virtue of reliance on the voting process. It affords the only non-coercive way of
negotiating a mutually beneficial transaction yet devised, and it leads to mone-
tary results that comport with a coherent view of the competing interests of
the majority and the minority. Such benefits should not lightly be foregone in
favor of expensive, time-consuming and unpredictable substantive review.
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